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ABSTRACT 
My thesis explores the effects of physical and cognitive activity levels—i.e., active and 
inactive behaviors—upon consumer judgments and decisions. I hypothesize that active or 
inactive conditions impact ongoing or subsequent, often unrelated consumer and social behavior 
through various psychological processes. I investigate this proposition through two series of 
studies designed to look at (a) situational conditions that trigger active and inactive behaviors in 
the decision making process (Essay 1) and (b) the effect of active and inactive behaviors on 
subsequent, unrelated performance and decisions made in various domains (Essay 2). Essay 1 
finds that situational conditions provoke passive decision making (i.e., low motivation and/or 
low ability to expend effort) that increases passive reliance on default options. Situational 
conditions that trigger active decision making (i.e., high motivation and/or high ability to expend 
effort), however, can attenuate or reverse reliance on default options. Essay 2 shows that prior 
active behaviors (e.g., walking, running) invoke general action goals, which in turn increase the 
perceived motivational fit with the immediate deadline, compared with prior inactive behaviors 
(e.g., standing, sitting) that invoke general inaction goals. As a result, prior active behaviors 
enhance the likelihood of initiating an action by an immediate deadline more than do prior 
inactive behaviors. However, this effect is absent when the deadline is distant because general 
action and inaction goals are thus less relevant. These two essays contribute to our understanding 
of how activity levels influence judgment, decision making, and performance in consumer and 
social contexts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Consumer choices are often affected by certain cognitive and physical conditions, even 
when these conditions seem irrelevant. In particular, consumers’ decisions may be influenced by 
whether or not they engage in active or inactive behaviors prior to and during the decision 
making process. For example, the decision to go shopping may be influenced by previous 
behaviors such as running or sitting. Likewise, the acceptance of a default option may depend 
upon whether one inputs more or less cognitive effort when thinking about the decision at hand. 
Active and inactive behaviors can be defined by the degree of physical and/or cognitive 
effort someone puts into an action. This definition is built upon the notion of action and inaction 
representing two ends of a continuum of activity, varying in the degree of motor and/or cognitive 
output (Albarracín et al., 2008; Albarracín, Hepler, & Tannenbaum, 2011; Gendolla & Silvestrini, 
2010; Laran, 2010). Employing this polarity, high-intensity physical and/or cognitive activities 
(e.g., running or high level deliberation) are active behaviors, whereas low-intensity physical 
and/or cognitive activities (e.g., sitting or low level deliberation) represent inactive behaviors. 
My thesis examines how active or inactive behaviors affect ongoing and subsequent consumer 
decisions through various psychological processes, seeking to answer the following questions: 
What factors will drive active and inactive behaviors in the decision making process? How will 
active and inactive behaviors affect judgments and decisions? Will the effects depend upon the 
choice format? Will it be contingent upon the marketing strategy involved in consumer decisions? 
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The first series of studies (Essay 1) investigates factors determining the likelihood of 
engaging in active or passive1 decision making, which affects the probability of accepting a 
default option. The second series (Essay 2) concerns how the active (e.g., running, walking) and 
inactive (e.g., standing, sitting) behaviors of decision makers affect intentions and decisions by 
triggering general goals to be active and inactive, which in turn alter their perceived fit with the 
action cues (e.g., a deadline). In a nutshell, Essay 1 examined the conditions that lead to active 
and inactive behaviors in the decision making process, which have significant downstream 
impacts on choices. Essay 2 provided evidence of the goal mediation process elicited by the 
active and inactive behaviors. Both essays contribute to our understanding of the effects of active 
and inactive behaviors on decisions, intentions, and performance in consumer and social contexts.  
In the following sections, I will review relevant literature regarding factors leading to 
active and inactive behaviors, and how these behaviors—as well as conditions leading to an 
active disposition—affect future behaviors and decisions through procedural knowledge and 
mindsets, general action-inaction goals, and goal-mediated processes. The research reviewed in 
this chapter sets up the theoretical foundation for this thesis. 
Factors Leading to Active and Inactive Behaviors 
Whether or not people engage in active or inactive behaviors may be determined by their 
ability and motivation. Motivation and ability are critical factors for determining the extent to 
which people engage in a cognitive process. For example, in the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM, Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983; Darley & Smith, 1993; Kang & Herr, 2006; Shavitt, 
Swan, Lowrey, & Wanke, 1994; for reviews, see Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995; Wegener, 
Petty, Smoak, & Fabrigar, 2004), people who have the motivation and ability to process 
																																								 																				
1 I use inactive and passive interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
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persuasive messages adopt the central persuasion route during which they thoroughly process the 
messages. By contrast, people who lack the motivation or the ability to process persuasive 
messages adopt the peripheral persuasion route, in which messages are processed heuristically. 
Therefore, when people have the ability and motivation to exert the effort, they are likely to 
engage in active behaviors such as running and high level deliberation during decision making. 
By contrast, when people lack the ability or motivation to exert the effort, they are likely to 
engage in inactive behaviors such as sitting and low deliberation during decision making. Essay 
1 explores how these two factors—ability and motivation—affect the likelihood of engaging in 
active or passive decision making, as a result of which people make distinct decisions. Active or 
inactive behaviors may also be determined by prior physical activities; for example, people may 
engage in active behaviors such as running or inactive behaviors such as sitting prior to making 
an unrelated consumer decision. Essay 2 explores how these prior physical behaviors affect 
subsequent and unrelated decisions.  
Active-Inactive Behaviors and Behavioral Mindsets 
Active and inactive behaviors may affect subsequent decisions by triggering behavioral 
mindsets through stimulating certain procedural knowledge. Procedural knowledge is one of the 
two types of knowledge that are delineated to categorize information people store in their 
memory (Smith, 1994). The other type of knowledge, declarative knowledge, is defined as the 
content of cognition, such as the information that people acquire, process, store in memory, and 
use in judgment (e.g., semantic concepts about persons, objects, events, beliefs, and attitudes; 
Smith, 1994). Procedural knowledge, by contrast, entails processes that act on declarative 
knowledge, routines, or sequences of actions that people perform to pursue a particular goal 
(Smith, 1994). For example, a sequence of actions may be stored in the form: If [X] happens, 
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then [Y] happens (Anderson, 1982, 1983). In a later situation, if [X] is activated incidentally, [Y] 
may also be activated automatically and the likelihood of performing [Y] will increase.  
Procedural knowledge may be activated by executing an action that leaves behavioral 
routines accessible for use in a new but relevant context, a process that has been termed 
behavioral mindset (for a review see Wyer, Shen, & Xu, 2013). For example, Xu and Wyer 
(2008) found that participants who compared the height of animals were more likely to 
spontaneously compare different types of chocolate candy at a later time because the comparison 
triggered the procedural knowledge of making a purchase (i.e., comparing products and then 
making a purchase). As a result, participants who compared animals first were more likely to 
make a purchase in an unrelated situation. Furthermore, Gollwitzer (1990) defined two types of 
mindsets: deliberative and implemental mindsets. People with a deliberative mindset consider the 
pros and cons of pursuing a specific action. By contrast, people with an implemental mindset 
focus on how to pursue said action. For example, in the shopping momentum effect, people first 
received twenty-five rupees as compensation for participating in a study and were then given the 
opportunity to purchase products from the experimenter. If people spent eighteen rupees to 
purchase the first product offered, they were more likely to use the leftover seven rupees to 
purchase a target keychain (Dhar, Huber, & Khan, 2007, Study 1). Similarly, people who were 
asked to participate in designating the price of a product had a higher purchase intention than did 
those who were given a fixed price to purchase the same product (Chandran & Morwitz, 2005), 
probably because the act of naming the price activated the implemental mindset of making a 
purchase, which led consumers to continue purchasing in a similar situation at a later time.  
Likewise, active and inactive behaviors may trigger behavioral mindsets by activating 
corresponding procedural knowledge. For example, thinking about running may activate the 
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procedural knowledge of putting on athletic shoes, leaving the house, and executing specific leg 
and arm movements. Once this sequence of movements is activated, it may increase the 
probability of running in a later situation. Moreover, running may activate more general action 
preparation and initiation procedures that lead to later initiation of similarly active behaviors in a 
new context. In this case, the performance of an action like running may influence effort 
deployment routines in new contexts, such as those of interest in this thesis. Therefore, active vs. 
inactive behaviors, such as running vs. standing, may activate the implemental mindset of a 
specific behavior that would persist in an unrelated but similar situation (e.g., continuing to run 
vs. continuing to stand). If the mindset mechanism is dominating the effect of past active and 
inactive behaviors on future behaviors, we should expect the effect to be consistent when people 
make decisions in similar situations. However, if the effects of prior active and inactive 
behaviors on future behaviors are contingent on certain moderators, such as the timing of 
enacting behavior (i.e., doing it now vs. doing it later), the mindset mechanism should give way 
to other mechanisms in explaining the effects. 
Action-Inaction Goals and Goal-Mediated Effects 
Active and inactive behaviors may also influence future behaviors and decisions through 
triggering goals that may affect present and subsequent behaviors in goal-mediated ways. Recent 
research documents the effects of general action-inaction goals (Albarracín et al., 2008; 
Albarracín, Wang, & Leeper, 2009; Gendolla & Silvestrini, 2010; Laran, 2010; for a review see 
Albarracín, Hepler, & Tannenbaum , 2011). A general action goal entails pursuing an energy-
demanding activity as the end state and often elicits an increase in physical and cognitive output. 
By contrast, a general inaction goal entails desiring a restful activity as the end state and 
ultimately elicits a decrease in physical and cognitive output.  
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General action and inaction goals, once activated, lead to either high or low motor and/or 
cognitive output, irrespective of the type of behavior. For example, participants incidentally 
exposed to general action words such as active and go exercise for longer than those exposed to 
inaction words such as stop and rest (Helper, Wang, & Albarracín, 2011). People who were 
primed with general action goals when shown active slogans, such as “Just Do It,” enjoyed the 
experience of processing difficult consumer information (e.g., products with many attributes) to 
a greater extent than did those who were primed with general inaction goals when shown 
inactive slogans, such as “You Deserve a Break Today” (Laran, 2010). Furthermore, action (vs. 
inaction) words presented during a memory task increased physiological effort indicated by more 
intense cardiovascular reactivity, as well as task performance indexed by quicker response time 
(Gendolla & Silvestrini, 2010).  
 General action goals can often be met by engaging in active behaviors conducive to a 
high level of activity as the end state. General inaction goals can be met correspondingly by 
engaging in inactive behaviors conducive to a low level of activity as the end state. For example, 
the general action goal can be satisfied by active behaviors including doodling on paper, folding 
a paper airplane, eating more raisins, and exercising for longer times. In contrast, the general 
inaction goal could be satisfied by inactive behaviors including closing one’s eyes to relax, 
eating fewer raisins, and exercising for shorter times (Albarracín et al., 2008, 2009).  
Nevertheless, when goals are at stake, behavior can be strategic and not always 
immediately congruent with said goals.  People who activate a general action goal may not be 
satisfied by the immediate active behavior that gives way to a low-activity end state. Likewise, 
people who activate a general inaction goal may not be satisfied by immediate inactive behavior 
that gives way to a high-activity end state. In research testing this prediction (Experiment 6 in 
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Albarracín et al., 2008), participants who were primed with a general action goal preferred to rest 
for about 30 seconds if they could then perform SAT-like problems for 3 minutes. Likewise, 
participants who were primed with a general inaction goal preferred to solve SAT-like problems 
for about 30 seconds if they could then rest for 3 minutes (Experiment 6 in Albarracín et al., 
2008). In other words, the means to achieve the action and inaction goals can be distinguished 
from the goals themselves.   
Like specific behavioral goals (Kruglanski et al., 2002), general action and inaction goals 
also possess properties of goal-mediated processes. Above all, if there was a delay between the 
initiation and the completion of action or inaction goals, the effect of the action-inaction goals 
was stronger compared with the no-delay condition. Furthermore, there is evidence of a decrease 
in the behavioral effects of action and inaction goals after the enactment of goal-consistent 
behaviors (e.g., Experiments 6 & 7 in Albarracín et al., 2008; also see Laran, 2010). Additionally, 
as successful goal attainment often results in positive affects (Fishbach, Shah, & Kruglanski, 
2004), people may have a more positive affect if general action and inaction goals are satisfied. 
As evidenced in Laran’s (2010) study, participants with a general action goal had a more positive 
affect after performing a complex task rather than a simple task. By contrast, participants with a 
general inaction goal had a more positive affect after performing a simple task rather than a 
complex one.  
General action and inaction goals may be activated in various ways. One way is to ask 
participants to complete fragmented action words such as ac_iv_ and g_ or inaction words such 
as st_ll and fr_ _ze (Albarracín et al., 2008). Alternatively, participants may be primed with 
general action or inaction goals when presented with active slogans such as “Just Do It,” or 
inactive slogans such as “You Deserve a Break Today”  (Laran, 2010). In a similar vein of 
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research, social power has been linked to the activation of action goals. For example, people who 
recalled a situation in which they had high social power were more likely to initiate an action 
(e.g., move an annoying fan in the lab room; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). In addition, 
personal involvement with an issue generally leads to a more active style of decision making and 
information processing. For example, recipients of persuasive messages who care about the issue 
in question are more likely to engage in deliberate processing than those who have little at stake 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). This form of more active cognitive processing has also been 
demonstrated for action goals. For example, people who have been primed with action concepts 
are more likely to solve GRE-type problems and correctly memorize information than those who 
have been primed with inaction concepts (Albarracín et al., 2008). Once activated, action-
inaction concepts can have direct effects on procedures (behavioral routines that can be activated 
in an automatic fashion) or can activate action and inaction goals that in turn influence 
procedures. In a nutshell, action and inaction goals may be elicited by the activation of many 
diverse means and procedures, and will ultimately be reflected in differences in activity level.  
Thus, in the context of my thesis, prior and ongoing active and inactive behaviors may 
give rise to general action and inaction goals, respectively, which in turn affect future decision 
making and behaviors following the goal-directed processes.  
The Present Research 
In this dissertation, I investigate questions related to active and inactive behaviors 
through two series of studies. In Chapter 2 (Essay 1), I present a series of studies investigating 
factors underlying the likelihood of engaging in active vs. passive decision making, which 
further affect the probability of accepting a default option. The default option is a well-
documented persuasive technique to increase behavioral compliance (e.g., Johnson & Goldstein, 
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2003; Madrian & Shea, 2001; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). For instance, people are more likely to 
become organ donors when the default option is to be an organ donor and they must explicitly 
opt out if they object (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). The power of this nudge, however, may build 
upon the underlying assumption that people are generally inactive and thus likely to comply with 
the normative influence imposed by defaults. I proposed that when people are able and/or willing 
to engage in active decision making, they are more likely to ignore or even question the default 
option, leading to a null or reverse default effect. Across six studies, I investigated the conditions 
in which people engage in active or passive decision making, which lead to varying 
consequences involving the default options.  
In Chapter 3 (Essay 2), I examined the effects of active and inactive physical behaviors 
on intentions and decision making with regard to limited-time marketing offers. Specifically, I 
consider whether being physically active (e.g., walking, running) or inactive (e.g., sitting, 
standing) stimulates general action or inaction goals. Once the goals are activated, they may 
affect a potential purchase by influencing one’s perceived fit with the marketing strategy of the 
sale (e.g., a deadline). Across one field experiment and three lab experiments, participants who 
enacted or imagined active (e.g., walking) vs. inactive (e.g., standing) behaviors made unrelated 
consumer decisions (e.g., redeeming a coupon, receiving a vaccine) associated with different 
time limits (e.g., with or without a deadline, with an immediate or distant deadline). As expected, 
participants were more likely to make purchases prior to a well-defined deadline after they 
enacted or imagined active behaviors than when they enacted or imagined inactive behaviors—
and perceived fit mediated this effect. Essay 2 also provided evidence of the goal mediation 
process elicited by the active and inactive behaviors. 
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CHAPTER 2 
“OPT IN” AND “OPT OUT” AS FUNCTIONS OF ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT: 
THE ROLE OF ABILITY AND MOTIVATION TO MAKE A DECISION 
The default option, which imposes a preselected choice on decision makers but still 
allows them to opt out, has been found to be a simple yet powerful tool to induce behavioral 
compliance (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Madrian & Shea, 2001; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; 
Thaler, Sunstein, & Balz, 2012). Extant research has shown that, even though the default option 
does not alter the true value of choice options, setting the recommended behavior as the default 
can encourage individuals to choose the option preferred by policy makers in various domains, 
from organ donation (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), to pension-plan choices (Madrian & Shea, 
2001), to car insurance (Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & Kunreuther, 1993), to taxi tips (Haggag 
& Paci, 2014).  
The power of the default, however, may build upon the underlying assumption that 
people are passive decision makers (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). For example, in Madrian and Shea’s 
(2001) study, 76% of employees who accepted a preselected retirement plan chose the 3% 
default contribution rate, lower than the contribution rates chosen by 80% of employees who 
were not presented with a preselected retirement plan. This finding suggests that even though the 
default format may increase the enrollment rate, the process is rather passive and has limited 
impacts. By contrast, an active choice format that encourages people to decide thoughtfully may 
be more consequential. In this chapter, I explore how ability and motivation influence the extent 
to which people engage in active vs. passive decision making, leading to distinct impacts on the 
default effect. Specifically, I define passive decision making as the situation in which people lack 
motivation and/or the ability to exert effort to make a decision, and active decision making as the 
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situation in which people have the motivation and ability to exert effort to make the decision. I 
proposed that the default effect would likely induce behavioral compliance when people engage 
in passive decision making rather than when they engage in active decision making. 
The Default Effect 
Plenty of evidence supports the advantage of a default option in persuading individuals to 
comply (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Madrian & Shea, 2001; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Thaler et 
al., 2012). For instance, people are more likely to become organ donors when the default option 
during driver’s license registration is to be an organ donor than when it is not (Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003). More employees enroll in a 401K-retirement plan if they are automatically 
enrolled and must opt out if they object (Madrian & Shea, 2001). Car rental customers are more 
likely to accept a car insurance plan when it is set as the default than they are when it has to be 
selected (Johnson et al., 1993). Taxi passengers are more likely to tip their drivers at the default 
rate provided by an automated system (Haggag & Paci, 2014). Additionally, online respondents 
are more likely to agree to be contacted for future surveys if the option notify me about more 
health surveys has been pre-checked, requiring them to uncheck it if they do not want further 
contact (Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse, 2002). The size of the default effect is also considerable. 
As reported by Johnson and Goldstein (2003), 82% of potential organ donors chose to become 
donors when this option was set as the default, compared with only 42% when organ donation 
was not the default and was therefore actively chosen. Similarly, 86% of new employees signed 
up for a specific retirement plan when the plan was set as the default, compared with only 50% 
when plans were actively chosen (Madrian & Shea, 2001).  
Three mechanisms have been proposed to explain these important and well documented 
default effects (Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, & Liu, 2011; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; McKenzie, 
 	 12 
Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006). First, the default options are likely to work because they offer 
clues concerning normative or adequate choices in specific situations (McKenzie et al., 2006). 
For example, people hold the belief that policymakers who set the default of becoming a donor –
or the human resource staff who set the default retirement plan–themselves favor the preselected 
options (McKenzie, et al., 2006). Second, defaults are likely to sway decisions because people 
are afraid of upsetting the status quo (Dinner et al., 2011; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). 
For instance, people prefer their current electric service provider to other providers, even though 
others might offer a more reliable or cheaper service, probably because the feeling of loss 
associated with any change is aversive (Hartman, Doane, & Woo, 1991). Third, the passive 
default represents a relatively effortless way of making a decision, and is thus favored when 
people experience difficulty making a decision. For example, decision makers are more likely to 
accept default options to customize the features of a business suit when they are asked to choose 
from a large choice set rather than a small one, because choosing from a large choice set is more 
difficult, while the default is relatively effortless (Levav, Heitmann, Herrmann, & Iyengar, 2010). 
Despite the overwhelming advantages of defaults, there are some known moderators. 
First, the default effect is present when decision makers are relatively naïve to the marketers’ 
intent (default: 62% vs. control: 46%; Brown & Krishna, 2004; Study 1) but weakens (default: 
48% vs. control: 54%; Brown & Krishna, 2004; Study 2) or even reverses (default: 44% vs. 
control: 62%; Brown & Krishna, 2004; Study 2), when decision makers suspect that the default 
is a marketing ploy. Second, the default effect appears to depend on the fit between the mood of 
decision makers and the nature of the default option, with happy (vs. sad) participants being 
more (vs. less) likely to choose a default to continue an experimental task in progress (80% vs. 
70%) but less (vs. more) likely to choose a default to switch to a new experimental task (69% vs. 
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89%; Shevchenko, Helversen, & Scheibehenne, 2014).  Third, difficult decisions motivate 
people to follow the default as a convenient heuristic device to simplify decisions and conserve 
effort, such as when there are more rather than fewer options in a choice set (53% vs. 25%, 
Tversky & Shafir, 1992; see also 53% vs. 28%; Levav et al., 2010). This latter research suggests 
that conditions reducing either the ability or the motivation to make a decision can increase 
reliance on defaults.  
Passive Decision Making and Active Decision Making 
I define passive decision making as the situation in which people lack the ability and/or 
motivation to exert the effort to make a decision. I proposed that when people lack this ability or 
motivation, their reliance on the default option may increase. Others, by contrast, may 
deliberately consider the pros and cons of the choice and will thus be less affected by the default 
when they have the ability or motivation to exert effort to make a decision. I define this as active 
decision making.  
Motivation and ability are critical factors for determining the extent to which people 
engage in a cognitive process. For example, in the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty et 
al., 1983; for reviews, see Petty et al., 1995; Wegener et al., 2004), both motivation and ability 
determine the likelihood of engaging in the processing of persuasive messages. When people 
have the motivation and ability to process persuasive messages, they will adopt the central 
persuasion route. In contrast, when people lack the motivation or ability to process persuasive 
messages, they will adopt the peripheral persuasion route. Compared with people following the 
peripheral route, those under the central route may be more likely persuaded by central cues such 
as argument quality and relevance of the spokesperson, and less likely persuaded by peripheral 
cues such as endorser-type and attractiveness of the spokesperson (Darley & Smith, 1993; Kang 
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& Herr, 2006; Petty et al., 1983).  
The active-passive decision making model shares vital factors with the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model. For example, people who demonstrate active decision making may engage in 
the central persuasion route, whereas those who demonstrate passive decision making may 
engage in the peripheral persuasion route. The two models are, nevertheless, distinct. For 
example, active decision makers may yet engage in peripheral processing, while passive decision 
makers may not engage in either central or peripheral processing, because they may not consider 
the decision at all.  
I proposed that when people adopt passive decision making (i.e., they lack the ability or 
motivation to make the decision), they may increase their reliance on the default option, simply 
because the default option represents a heuristic cue signaling an easy decision shortcut (Levav, 
et al., 2010; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). In contrast, when people adopt active decision making (i.e., 
when they have the ability or motivation to make the decision), they may deliberately consider 
the pros and cons of the choice and will thus be less likely to be affected by the choice format. In 
such a situation, three possible processes may occur. First, active decision makers may be more 
likely to revert to pre-existing attitudes to make the decision (Albarracín & Handley, 2011), in 
which case the choice format may have little impact. Second, if active decision makers lack a 
pre-existing attitude on an issue, they may have to generate the pros and cons of the available 
options at the time they make a decision. One possibility is that their decisions will be affected 
by the true values of their options, rather than the format in which the choice is presented. Third, 
active decision makers may counterargue the preselected option (Tormala & Petty, 2004), 
leading to a reverse default effect. In line with this, research has shown that consumers who are 
suspicious of marketers’ intent are more likely to choose non-default options (Brown & Krishna, 
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2004). In a nutshell, passive decision making enhances the default effect, whereas active decision 
making hampers the default effect (See Figure 2.1). 
Because people’s adoption of active or passive decision making depends upon their 
ability and motivation to expend effort in making a decision, I will, in the following sections, 
first discuss how the ability to choose may affect the default effect, and then present three studies 
supporting this hypothesis. After that, I will discuss how one’s motivation to choose may 
influence the default option, and then present two studies supporting this hypothesis. Finally, I 
will present one study in which I investigated ability and motivation at the same time. 
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Figure 2.1. Theoretical framework for understanding defaults. 
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Ability: Role of Time 
Time may often affect people’s ability to make a decision in two ways. First, the time 
available to analyze a choice may limit one’s ability to make an informed decision. For example, 
when one must rush to leave a cab, he/she may not be able to think through the decision about 
how much to tip the driver. A long line of psychological research (Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Weenig 
& Maarleveld, 2002; Wright, 1974; for a review, see Ariely & Zakay, 2001) suggests that when 
people do not have sufficient ability to examine the information of a decision (e.g., there is 
pressure to leave the situation, or not enough time to read the information), they are more likely 
to rely on heuristics cues to make decisions. For example, people who lack decision making 
ability rely on heuristic cues such as price for inferring product quality (Suri & Monroe, 2003). 
Likewise, the default option may serve as one such heuristic cue when there is limited time is to 
make a decision. 
Second, I proposed that a time delay between learning about and implementing a decision 
hampers the ability to make an informed decision. For instance, although employees may receive 
ample information about retirement plans when they begin a new job, the enrollment deadline is 
often far in the future, which leads to a higher likelihood of forgetting information about said 
plans prior to the deadline. In this context, another long scholarly tradition indicates that 
prospective memory—the psychological mechanism that ensures implementation of a decision 
after a delay—is poorer when the delay for implementing a decision is longer (e.g., Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1990; Macan, Gibson, & Cunningham, 2010; Smith, 2003; for reviews, see 
Brandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel, 2014). Therefore, when it comes to the default effect, a 
delay between the presentation of information and the implementation of a decision may lead to 
reduced decision making ability and reliance, however inadvertent, on the default option. In sum, 
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people may be more likely to rely on the default option when they have limited ability to make a 
decision due to either a short decision time or a time delay. 
Thus I argue that the default effect should be employed only when the time is right, and a 
review of the literature suggests that my hypotheses are plausible. Table 2.1 presents a summary 
of the results and study characteristics of ten research articles, some showing the described 
default effects and some presenting null effects or reversals. This table also includes a 
description of the likely decision time as well as whether or not there is likely to be a time delay. 
Decision time was considered short if the situation imposed time pressure and immediate 
implementation (e.g., giving tips to taxi drivers) and long otherwise (e.g., deciding on a 
retirement plan before a deadline that is sometimes months into the future). As shown in Table 
2.1, there were default effects when decision time was short (Haggag & Paci, 2014; Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003; Johnson et al., 1993) and when there was a time delay between presentation and 
implementation of the decision (Araña, León, Moreno-Gil, & Zubiaurre, 2013; Madrian & Shea, 
2001). In contrast, there were null effects, or even reversals, when the decision time was long 
and when there was no time delay (Brown & Krishna, 2004; Di Guida, Marchiori, & Erev, 2012; 
Keller et al., 2011; Shepherd & O'Carroll, 2013). This review rendered preliminary confidence in 
my hypotheses; subsequently, three studies in which participants made money donation decisions 
were conducted to test these hypotheses. Studies 1 and 2 respectively included a measure and a 
manipulation of the decision time participants spent in making decisions. Study 3 served to 
examine the effects of both the decision time and the time delay on the default effect. 
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Table 2.1. Summary of sample articles on the default effect. 
# Short reference Description of participants and decision Setting Likely 
decision time 
Likely  
a time delay 
Observed 
effect 
1 Johnson et al. (1993) Drivers deciding whether or not to acquire the 
right to sue when purchasing insurance 
Field Short No Default effect 
2 Johnson & 
Goldstein (2003) 
Driver license applicants deciding whether or not 
to become organ donors 
Field & 
Lab 
Short No Default effect 
3 Madrian & Shea 
(2001) 
Employees deciding whether or not to enroll in a 
retirement plan  
Field Long Yes Default effect 
4 Araña et al. (2013) Individuals deciding whether or not to pay 
additional taxes on vacation expenditures to help 
prevent global warming 
Lab & 
Field 
Long Yes Default effect 
5 Haggag & Paci 
(2014) 
Taxi passengers deciding whether or not to tip the 
default percentage on a taxi ride 
Lab & 
Field 
Short No Default effect 
6 Reiter et al. (2012) Parents deciding whether or not to have their sons 
receive the vaccine against the Human 
Papillomavirus  
Lab Long No Reverse effect 
7 Di Guida et al. 
(2012) 
Experimental participants deciding whether or not 
to switch to a new task in the midst of the 
experimental session 
Lab Long No Null effect 
8 Keller et al. (2011) Participants deciding whether or not to receive a 
reminder to be vaccinated against the flu 
Field Long No Reverse effect 
9 Shepherd & 
O'Carroll (2013) 
Participants deciding whether or not to be organ 
donors 
Field Long No Null effect 
10 Brown & Krishna 
(2004) 
Consumers deciding whether or not to accept the 
default settings for specific products (e.g., 
keyboards, computers, and vacation packages) 
Lab Long No Reverse effect 
when people 
were skeptical 
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Study 1 
I predicted that the default choice format would lead to a higher likelihood of donation 
than the control choice format, particularly when participants spent relatively less time making 
their decision. In Study 1, after being awarded extra money for participating in an unrelated prior 
task, participants were asked if they wanted to donate their earnings to a charity. They were 
given one of two instructions: that they would donate unless they indicated their wish not to 
(default condition), or that they would not donate unless they indicated that they did want to 
(control condition). I measured the time participants spent making the decision as a critical factor 
expected to interact with the choice format manipulation.  
Method 
One hundred and twenty-two participants from the Amazon Mechanical Turk website (53% 
female; Mage = 38.07, SDage = 13.00, age range from 20 to 74; 98% native speakers of English; 80% 
Caucasian, 7% African American, 5% Hispanic, 5% Asian, 4% Other Ethnicity) were recruited 
to participate in this study in exchange for $0.50. I employed a 2 choice format (default vs. 
control) × continuous decision time, in which choice format was a between-subjects 
manipulation and decision time was measured.  
After participants completed an unrelated task, they were told that they would receive an 
additional $0.10 payment to reward their good work on the previous task. They were then 
directed to read about a donation campaign for a nonprofit child cancer charity and to report 
whether or not they would like to donate their extra earnings to said charity. Half of the 
participants were told that they would make an automatic donation unless they clicked on a mark 
(a smiley face) on the next page (default condition). The other half was told that they would have 
to click on the smiley face on the next page to make a donation (control condition, see 
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manipulations in Appendix A). All the participants were asked to write down their understanding 
of the instructions to ensure successful manipulation of the choice format. A manipulation check 
at the end of the study showed that 96% of participants understood the choice format correctly, 
suggesting a successful manipulation. After that, participants proceeded to the next page and 
made their donation choices in the format corresponding to each condition. The time they spent 
making the decisions was recorded in seconds. Finally, participants reported such demographical 
information as gender, age, and ethnicity. At the end of the study, participants who chose not to 
donate received their extra $0.10 in addition to their original payment. Any amount that was 
donated by participants was donated to the charitable organization as promised.   
Results and Discussion 
I performed a logistic regression with donation behavior (no donation = 0, donation = 1) 
as the outcome and choice format (control = −0.5, default = 0.5), decision time (M = 3.75, SD = 
3.90, Min = 0.44, Max = 30.86), and their interaction as predictors. As shown in Table 2.2, the 
interaction between choice format and decision time was significant, as were the main effects of 
choice format and time. To probe the interaction, I used the Johnson-Neyman technique (i.e., 
floodlights analysis, Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch, & McClelland, 2013). This analysis revealed 
that the effect of choice format on donation was significantly positive when individuals spent 
less than 1.60 seconds making the decision (BJN = 0.999, SE = .510, p = .05), but was 
significantly negative when individuals spent more than 3.90 seconds making the decision (BJN = 
−1.119, SE = .571, p = .05; for visualization of the results, see Figure 2.2). In other words, as 
predicted, participants who spent relatively less time making the decision donated more with the 
default format than with the control format. By contrast, participants who spent relatively more 
time making the decision donated less with the default than with the control format.  
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Table 2.2. Results from Study 1. 
  B S.E. Wald χ2  df p Exp(B) χ2  
Model Fit    3 .001  17.029 
Constant −1.357 0.447 9.225 1 .002 0.257   
Choice Format 2.475 0.893 7.673 1 .006 11.878 
 Continuous Decision Time 0.489 0.153 10.201 1 .001 1.63   
Choice format × Continuous 
Decision Time 
−0.922 0.306 9.071 1 .003 0.398   
NOTE.—B is the estimated logit coefficient. S.E. is the standard error of the coefficient. Wald χ2= 
[B/S.E.]2. df is the degrees of freedom. p is the significance level of the coefficient. Exp(B) is the odds 
ratio of the individual coefficient.  χ2 is the coefficient of the overall model test. 
In a nutshell, Study 1 showed that the default format led to more donations than did the 
control format only when participants spent less (vs. more) time making the decision. Although 
these results were consistent with my predictions, the use of a measured variable of decision time 
renders it necessary to directly manipulate the decision time for a stronger demonstration. Study 
2 achieved this objective. 
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Figure 2.2. Visualization of the results from Study 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE.—Panel A shows a floodlight of the region of Decision Time values (filled area below 1.60 and 
above 3.90) for which spotlight tests revealed significant differences between the control and default 
choice format conditions. Panel B shows a graph of the estimated simple effect of the choice format (the 
distance between the two regression lines in Panel A) as a solid line with confidence bands signaled by 
dotted lines.  
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Study 2 
In Study 2, I directly manipulated decision time, expecting that when the time to make 
the decision was limited, the default format would lead to more donations than the control format. 
In contrast, when the time was unlimited, the default format may have lesser or no advantage 
over the control format. Additionally, I used a hypothetical donation choice in Study 2 as a way 
of testing the robustness of the effect of decision time.  
Method 
One hundred and nineteen participants from the Amazon Mechanical Turk website (43% 
female; Mage = 35.01, SDage = 11.85, age 19 to 66; 98% native speakers of English; 73% 
Caucasian, 11% African American, 7% Hispanic, 7% Asian, 3% Other Ethnicity) were recruited 
to participate in this study in exchange for $0.50 payment. I used a 2 choice format (default vs. 
control) × 2 decision time (limited vs. unlimited) between-subjects design.  
As in Study 1, participants were awarded an additional $0.10 in earnings for a prior 
unrelated task and were asked to imagine that they had the opportunity to donate the additional 
money to the same nonprofit child cancer charity as in Study 1. They also learned that they 
would receive the additional funds regardless of their donation choice because it was a 
hypothetical donation decision (see manipulations in Appendix B). The choice format was 
manipulated in the same way as in Study 1, and a manipulation check showed that 97% of 
participants understood the choice format correctly. Furthermore, participants were told that they 
had either two seconds (limited time condition) or unlimited time (unlimited time condition) to 
make the decision. The other procedures were the same as in Study 1. At the end of the study, all 
the participants received their $0.10 earnings in addition to their original payment.  
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Results and Discussion 
I performed a logistic regression with donation behavior (no donation = 0, donation = 1) 
as the outcome and choice format (control = −0.5, default = 0.5), decision time (unlimited = −0.5, 
limited = 0.5), and their interaction as predictors. As shown in Table 2.3, the interaction between 
choice format and decision time was significant, as was the main effect of choice format.  To 
probe the interaction, I ran chi-square tests comparing the control and default conditions within 
each decision time condition (for percentages of all the conditions, see Table 2.3). When the 
decision time was limited to two seconds, the default choice format (73%) led to more donations 
than the control choice format (31%), χ2 (1) = 10.581, p = .001. In contrast, when the decision 
time was unlimited, the default choice format (50%) had no significant advantage over the active 
choice format (57%), χ2 (1) = .268, p = .605.  
The results from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that the default choice yields greater behavioral 
compliance; however, this effect is moderated by decision time. Participants who spent less time 
making the decision were more likely to comply with the default option. In contrast, participants 
who spent more time making their decision did not show the default effect. Instead, as in Study 1, 
when the decision time was long, more participants donated in response to the control choice 
format than the default choice format. 
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Table 2.3. Results from Study 2. 
Regression B S.E. Wald χ2 df p Exp(B) χ2 
Model Fit    3 .011  11.196 
Constant 0.12 0.194 0.386 1 .535 1.128   
Choice format 0.771 0.388 3.958 1 .047 2.162 
 Decision time −0.028 0.388 0.005 1 .943 0.973   
Choice format × 
Decision time 
2.078 0.775 7.192 1 .007 7.991 
  
 Percentages of Donation     
Condition Default Control Difference      
  Limited Time 73% 31% 42%     
  Unlimited Time 50% 57% −7%     
NOTE.—B is the estimated logit coefficient. S.E. is the standard error of the coefficient. Wald χ2= 
[B/S.E.]2. df is the degree of freedom. p is the significance level of the coefficient. Exp(B) is the odds 
ratio of the individual coefficient. χ2 is the coefficient of the overall model test. Difference was calculated 
by subtracting the percentage of donation in the Control condition from that in the Default condition. 
	
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 examined the influence of decision time on the default effect. In addition 
to replicating the effect of decision time, Study 3 further tested the effect of a time delay between 
the presentation of decision information and decision implementation on the default effect. As 
described earlier, prospective memory may be poorer when there is a delay between the 
presentation of information and decision implementation, leading to the use of the default option. 
I manipulated the time delay by asking participants to make decisions either immediately after 
they learned about the decision or after a delay. Concurrently, I manipulated the decision time 
from Study 2 by fixing the response time to be either two seconds, or unlimited. I predicted two 
two-way interactions: between the time delay and choice format, and between the decision time 
and choice format.  
Method 
One hundred and seventy participants from a Midwestern American university (61% 
female; Mage = 20.08, SDage = 1.29, age from 18 to 27; 59% native speakers of English; 43% 
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Caucasian, 3% African American, 4% Hispanic, 49% Asian, 2% Other Ethnicity) were recruited 
to participate in this study in exchange for course credit. I employed a 2 choice format (default vs. 
control) × 2 decision time (limited vs. unlimited) × 2 time delay (immediate vs. delayed) 
between-subjects design.  
After completing an unrelated task, participants were told that they would receive $1 in 
addition to their class credit to reward their good work on the previous task. They were then 
asked to read about a donation campaign for a university athletic department, followed by the 
offer to donate their additional $1 to the campaign. The choice format and the decision time were 
manipulated in the same way as in Study 2. The time delay was manipulated by asking 
participants to make the decision either immediately after they read about the campaign and the 
donation (immediate condition), or later, after completing an unrelated task that took 
approximately five minutes (delayed condition). Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the eight conditions (see all the manipulations in Appendix C). Finally, participants indicated the 
choice format they were presented during donation choices, the results of which showed that 75% 
of participants answered correctly, suggesting a successful manipulation of choice format. At the 
end of the study, participants who chose not to donate received $1 in addition to the promised 
course credit. Any amount that was donated by participants was donated to the nonprofit 
organization as promised.   
Results and Discussion 
A logistic regression was performed to predict donation behavior (no donation = 0, 
donation = 1) from choice format (control = −0.5, default = 0.5), decision time (unlimited = −0.5, 
limited = 0.5), time delay (immediate = −0.5, delayed = 0.5), and all interaction terms. As shown 
in Table 2.4, the main effects of the choice format and the two two-way interactions—between 
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choice format and decision time, and between choice format and time delay—were all 
statistically significant. The interaction with decision time implied that the advantage of the 
default format was greater when the decision time was limited (vs. unlimited). The interaction 
with time delay suggested that the advantage of the default format was greater when the decision 
was implemented after a delay, rather than immediately after receiving the information. Another 
interesting aspect of this study is that the effects of decision time and time delay were additive—
that is, a longer decision window allowed participants to avoid the default, despite the delay 
between receiving the information and implementing the decision.  
As predicted, the results of Study 3 showed that the default effect was stronger when 
participants made delayed decisions compared with when they made decisions immediately. 
Furthermore, I replicated the previous finding that the default effect was stronger when people 
had little (vs. more) time to make the decision. Across the three studies, I tested whether or not 
the default effect was influenced by the decision time and the time delay between receiving and 
making a decision. To move beyond the default option requires an informed decision that 
involves information encoding and thoughtful, timely decision implementation. Limited decision 
time hampers the ability to encode information to make an informed decision, and prolonged 
time delay further limits prospective memory and thus adequate execution of the decision. Both 
limitations in ability can induce reliance on the default as is likely with other forms of heuristic 
processing. 
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Table 2.4. Results from Study 3. 
  B S.E. Wald χ2  df p Exp(B) χ2 
Model Fit    7 <.001  51.11 
Constant −0.208 0.191 1.195 1 .274 0.812   
Choice format 2.202 0.381 33.405 1 <.001 9.044  
Decision time 0.266 0.381 0.489 1 .484 1.305   
Time delay 0.021 0.381 0.003 1 .956 1.021   
Choice format * Time delay 1.567 0.762 4.229 1 .04 4.793  
Choice format * Decision time 1.652 0.762 4.699 1 .03 5.216  
Decision time * Time delay −0.651 0.762 0.729 1 .393 0.522  
Choice format * Decision time * 
Time delay 
1.748 1.524 1.315 1 .251 5.742 
 
              Percentages of Donation    
Condition  Default Control Difference    
Immediate Limited time 73% 30% 43%    
 Unlimited time 50% 26% 24%    
Delayed Limited time 87% 9% 78%    
 Unlimited time 67% 26% 41%    
NOTE.—B is the estimated logit coefficient. S.E. is the standard error of the coefficient. Wald χ2= 
[B/S.E.]2. df is the degree of freedom. p is the significance level of the coefficient. Exp(B) is the odds 
ratio of the individual coefficient. χ2 is the coefficient of the overall model test. Difference was calculated 
by subtracting the percentage of donation in the Control condition from that in the Default condition. 
 
Motivation: Role of Choice Involvement 
In the following section, I will further discuss how the motivation to make a decision has 
an impact on the default effect, and will present three studies demonstrating the effect. 
Motivation in making a decision may be affected by individuals’ personal involvement 
with a given choice. According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986; Petty et al., 1983), high-personal-relevant choices that are typically associated with self-
interest are more motivating than low-personal-relevant choices, which are made considering 
public gains and normative pressure to act in a selfless, altruistic manner. Although some 
decisions may be both high- and low-personal-relevant (e.g., savings in taxes from certain 
philanthropic efforts), they can be empirically and theoretically distinguished. When making a 
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low-personal-relevant choice, people are less motivated to consider the pros and cons of different 
options, and may intentionally choose the default option ostensibly suggested by policymakers–
or unintentionally end up with the default option if they do not make a decision at all.  
In contrast, when making a high-personal-relevant choice, people are more likely to be 
motivated to exert effort in making a decision. Three psychological processes may arise when 
decision makers actively consider choices. First, they may be more likely to retrieve their pre-
existing attitudes to make the decision (Albarracín & Handley, 2011). As a result, the choice 
format may have little impact. Second, if active decision makers lack a pre-existing attitude 
about an issue, they may generate the pros and cons of the available options at the time they 
make a decision. In this case, one possibility is that they may choose based on the true value of 
the options rather than the choice format, leading to a null effect of the choice format. Third, 
active decision makers may even counterargue the preselected option (Tormala & Petty, 2004), 
leading to a reverse default effect. Consistent with this prediction, consumers who are suspicious 
of the intent of marketers are more likely to choose the non-default options (Brown & Krishna, 
2004).  
In sum, when people are less motivated to invest effort in making a decision (i.e., making 
low-personal-relevant choices), they may be more likely to comply with the default option, 
resulting in the previously identified default effect. However, when decision makers are more 
motivated to input effort in making a decision (i.e., when they are making high-personal-relevant 
choices), they may either be immune to the choice format or increase behavioral compliance in a 
way that produces a reverse default effect. In a nutshell, the processes and potential outcomes of 
the choice format may depend on whether or not people have the motivation to invest effort in 
making the decision.  
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In the following sections, I present three studies in which participants either made high-
personal-relevant or low-personal-relevant choices. Hypothetically, when people make low-
personal-relevant choices, they have low motivation to make a deliberate decision, leading them 
to rely on the default option. In contrast, when people make high-personal-relevant choices, they 
have high motivation to make a deliberate decision, leading them to overcome the effect of 
choice format. In the latter case, people may even counterargue the default option, inducing a 
reverse default effect. 
Study 4 
In Study 4, I manipulated the choice types to be either low- or high-personal-relevant. 
Participants were asked to decide whether or not they would participate in an additional survey 
for extra money (high-personal-relevant choice) or whether or not they would donate extra 
money to a charity (low-personal-relevant choice). I predicted that the default effect would be 
present in low-personal-relevant choices, but would be weaker and even reversed in high-
personal-relevant choices.  
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and fifty-nine participants (57% female; Mage = 
38.28, SDage = 13.67, aged from 18 to 71; 98% native speakers of English; 77% Caucasian, 13% 
African American, 1% Hispanic, 4% Asian, 4% Other Ethnicity) recruited from the Amazon 
Turk online subject pool participated in exchange for $0.50. The study employed a 2 choice type 
(low-personal-relevance vs. low-personal-relevance choice) x 2 choice format (default vs. 
control) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to any of the four 
conditions in the design.  
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Procedure and measures. In the low-personal-relevant choice conditions, as in Study 1, 
participants received $0.30 as an additional reward for their efforts after completing an unrelated 
task. They were then asked if they wanted to donate the additional $0.30 to the nonprofit child 
cancer organization. Participants made their choices with either the default or the control format. 
In the high-personal-relevant choice conditions, participants were told after completing the same 
unrelated task that they would receive an additional $0.30 as a reward if they completed an 
additional short survey that lasted five minutes. They further learned that this additional survey 
did not require a large number of responses, and that they were free to decide whether or not to 
complete it. The participants then made their choices with either the default or the control format 
(see all the manipulations in Appendix D). I expected the default effect to emerge in the low-
personal-relevant choices and a reverse default effect to emerge in the high-personal-relevant 
choices. 
Results & Discussion 
As predicted, the logistic regression showed that the interaction between choice type and 
choice format was significant, B = .633, SE = .21, Wald(1) =9.104, p = .003. Specifically, the 
default effect emerged in the low-personal-relevant choices, with participants being more likely 
to donate in response to the default format (56%) than the control format (33%), χ2 (1) = 4.575, p 
= .032. In contrast, the reverse default effect arose in the high-personal-relevant choices, with 
participants being more likely to choose to participate in an additional survey in response to the 
control (93%) rather than the default option (73%), χ2 (1) = 5.541, p = .019 (see Figure 2.3). These 
results confirmed my hypothesis that, while the default format leads to more behavioral 
compliance when people are less motivated to make the decision, the control choice format leads 
to more behavioral compliance when people are more motivated to make the decision.  
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Figure 2.3. Mean behavioral compliance (Study 4). 
 
Study 5 
In Study 5, I intended to replicate the results of Study 4 by decreasing the amount of 
money to test the robustness of the results. Study 5 proceeded using the exact same procedure 
from Study 4, except that the monetary amount decreased from $0.30 to $0.01. By significantly 
decreasing the stakes, the relative valence of the choice type may be reversed–that is, while 
donating $0.30 is less positive than earning $0.30, donating $0.01 should be more positive than 
earning $0.01. If the combined effects of the choice type and choice format still emerge, it would 
suggest that this effect may be less likely explained by such theories as approach-avoidance 
motivation (Elliot & Church, 1997) and regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) that would 
suggest the results are sensitive to valence of the choice type. 
Method 
Participants and design. Two hundred and ninety three participants (58% female; Mage = 
37.38, SDage = 13.21, age from 18 to 79; 98% native speakers of English; 77% Caucasian, 10% 
African American, 4% Hispanic, 6% Asian, 3% Other Ethnicity) from the Amazon Mechanical 
Turk online subject pool participated in exchange for $0.50. The study employed a 2 choice type 
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(high-personal-relevant choice vs. low-personal-relevant choice) × 2 choice format (default vs. 
control) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to any of the four 
experimental conditions.  
Procedure and measures. The procedure of Study 5 was the same as that of Study 4. 
The only difference was that the extra reward decreased from $0.30 to $0.01 (see all the 
manipulations in Appendix E).  
Results & Discussion 
Even with a decreased extra reward, the pattern of the results mirrored that of Study 4. 
The logistic regression suggested that the interaction between choice type and choice format was 
statistically significant, B = −.593, SE = .14, Wald(1) =17.99, p < .001. Confirming the default 
effect for low-personal-relevant choices, participants assigned to low-personal-relevant 
conditions were more likely to donate their money when they were presented with the default 
option (88%) than with the control option (74%), χ2 (1) = 4.257, p = .039. Similarly, confirming 
the reverse default effect for high-personal-relevant choices, participants assigned to the high-
personal-relevant conditions were more likely to participate in the additional survey when they 
were presented with the control option (51%) than with the default option (34%), χ2 (1) = 4.671, p 
= .031 (see Figure 2.4).  
These results demonstrated the robustness of the combined effects of the choice type and 
choice format across the relative valence of the choice type. A further analysis combining the 
results of the two studies suggests that when the monetary amount was greater (i.e., $0.30), the 
percentage of participants who chose to earn this amount (83%) was significantly higher than 
that of participants who chose to donate this amount (44%), χ2 (1) = 25.027, p <.001, suggesting 
that earning $0.30 was more positive than donating the same amount. In contrast, when the 
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monetary amount was small (i.e., $0.01), the percentage of people who chose to donate this 
amount (81%) was significantly higher than that of participants who chose to earn this amount 
(43%), χ2 (1) = 44.926, p <.001, suggesting that donating $0.01 was more positive than earning 
$0.01. Therefore, the relative valence of the choice type varied as a function of the monetary 
amount. Yet, regardless of the relative valence of the choice type, the default effect showed in 
the low-personal-relevant choices, whereas the reverse default effect emerged in high-personal-
relevant choices. This suggests that alternative explanations associated with valence (e.g., 
Approach-Avoidance motivation (Elliot & Church, 1997); Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 
1997) may be less likely to explain the different impacts of low- or high-personal-relevant 
choices on the default effect. 
 
Figure 2.4. Mean behavioral compliance (Study 5). 
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Study 6 
In Study 6, I investigated the effects of ability and motivation on the default effect within 
the same study. Participants were asked to make the same low-personal-relevant choice (i.e., 
donation). Before that, they were induced to either think in favor of their own interest, or think in 
favor of others’ interest. In the control condition, people were not induced to think anything 
before making the decision. Presumably, when the motivation to make a decision is high (i.e., the 
decision is in one’s own interest), people may counterargue the default and show the reverse 
default effect. In contrast, when the motivation to make a decision is low (i.e., the decision is in 
another’s interest or control), people may passively rely on the default option. To gauge the 
effects of ability, I measured the time people spent making the decision, as in Study 1. I 
predicted that the effect of motivation on compliance with the default option would be more 
evident when people spent less (vs. more) time making their decision.  
Method 
Participants and design. Three hundred and seventy participants from the Amazon Turk 
Website (45% female; Mage = 35.39, SDage = 11.526, age from 18 to 69; 98% native speakers of 
English; 75% Caucasian, 6% African American, 7% Hispanic, 9% Asian, 2% Other Ethnicity) 
participated in this study in exchange for $0.50. The study employed a 3 motivation (self-interest 
vs. other-interest vs. control) x 2 choice format (default vs. control) x a continuous decision time 
mixed design. Participants were randomly assigned to any of the six conditions in the design. 
Additionally, decision time was measured and analyzed as a continuous variable. 
Procedure and measures. After participants finished an irrelevant task, they were 
rewarded an extra $0.30. Participants were directed to another study, and were told to make 
decisions in favor of either their own interest or others’ interest. In the control condition, neither 
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self-interest nor other-interest was mentioned. Then participants were asked if they would like to 
donate their extra earnings to a charity. They were presented with either the default choice 
format or the control choice format, as in previous studies (see all the manipulations in Appendix 
F). I also measured decision time (log transformed) as I did in Study 1.  
Results and Discussion 
Effects on behavioral compliance. As predicted, the logistic regression was performed 
to predict donation behavior from choice format (control = 1, default = 0), motivation (self=1, 
control=2, other = 3, analyzed as a continuous variable)2, the decision time (continuous variable), 
and all interaction terms. Results suggested that there was a three-way interaction, Wald (1) = 
6.061, p = .014. I used the PROCESS procedure (Model 3, Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) to 
probe the interaction. With a shorter decision time (SD (decision time) = -1), the interaction of 
choice format and motivation on donation was significant, Z = 2.187, p = .03. Participants in the 
low motivation condition (i.e., the decision was in others’ interest) were more likely to donate 
with the default format than with the control format, Effect = 1.22, p = .03, whereas the 
advantage of the default option was attenuated when participants had high motivation to make a 
decision in their own interest, Effect = −.47,  p = .34. Participants in the control condition fell in 
the middle. However, with a longer decision time (SD (decision time) = 1) during which 
participants were able to make a deliberate decision, the results suggested a reverse default effect. 
Participants were more likely to donate with the control format than with the default format 
when they had low motivation, Effect = −1.17, p = .02 and in the control condition, Effect = −.73, 
p = .031. Noticeably, the choice format had no effect on the donation when people had high 
																																								 																				
2 When the motivation was analyzed as two dummy variables (dummy 1: other =1, self & control 
= 0; dummy 2: control = 1, self & other = 0), the three-way interaction was still significant, Wald 
(2) = 6.036, p = .049.  
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motivation and longer decision time, Effect = −.29, p = .49. These results (see Table 2.5) 
suggested that ability and motivation might interact with each other to influence people’s 
decisions with the default option.  
 
Table 2.5. Conditional effects of choice format and motivation on donation with short and long 
decision time. 
Ability Motivation Effect SE Z p 95% CI 
Low ability 
(Shorter 
decision 
time) 
Low motivation (i.e., 
thinks in others’ interest) 
1.22 .55 2.20 .03 (.13, 2.30) 
Control .38 .38 .99 .324 (−.37, 1.12) 
High motivation (i.e., 
thinks in own interest) 
−.47 .53 −.882 .378 (−1.51, .57) 
High ability 
(Longer 
decision 
time) 
Low motivation (i.e., 
thinks in others’ interest) 
−1.17 .50 −2.34 .02 (−2.15, −.19) 
Control −.73 .34 −2.16 .031 (−1.40, −.07) 
High motivation (i.e., 
thinks in own interest) 
−.29 .43 −.685 .494 (−1.14, .55) 
 
 
General Discussion 
Despite the attention paid to the default effect in research over the years, the influence of 
ability and motivation on said effect has remained unclear even though both factors are critical in 
persuasion (Darley & Smith, 1993; Kang & Herr, 2006; Petty et al., 1983; Shavitt et al., 1994). 
Across six studies, my research investigated an important boundary factor of the default effect, 
i.e., whether people engage in active decision making or passive decision making when 
considering the default option (for a summary of all studies, see Table 2.6). Active decision 
making results from high motivation and high ability to make a decision, whereas passive 
decision making results from either low motivation or low ability to make a decision. I proposed 
that people who engaged in passive decision making were more likely to rely on the default 
option, leading to the documented default effect. However, people who engaged in active 
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decision making were more likely to be either immune to the choice format or counterargue the 
default option, leading to a null effect or a reverse default effect. Studies 1-3 manipulated high vs. 
low ability to make a deliberate decision through long vs. short decision time and a time delay. 
Studies 4 and 5 manipulated high vs. low motivation to make a deliberate decision through high-
personal-relevant vs. low-personal-relevant choices. Study 6 manipulated ability and motivation 
together through decision time and motivation for donation. Taken together, the six studies 
confirmed my hypothesis that active vs. passive decision making–as a function of ability and 
motivation—moderated the default effect. Furthermore, I found that people with high motivation 
to make a decision (e.g., those making high-personal-relevant choices) might counterargue the 
default option, showing the reverse default effect. This reverse default effect was interesting, 
although its robustness warrants further testing. Nevertheless, it suggests that people who engage 
in active decision making may not prefer an imposed default option.  
This research has implications in designing appropriate choice structure to promote 
recommended behavior. Let’s take charitable donations, for example. Since individual donors 
constitute the primary contributors to charitable organizations in the USA, contributing about 70% 
of all U.S. donations in recent years (Giving USA, 2015), methods to increase these donations 
are of central concern to both fundraisers and social scientists (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009). 
One line of research claims that the intrinsic motivation of beneficence drives donation behavior 
(Meier, 2007). As a result, individual giving may increase in response to communications that 
highlight the significance of giving. A different line of research, however, suggests that 
philanthropy often depends on extrinsic, seemingly inconsequential cues such as thank you 
wristbands and tax breaks (Ariely et al., 2009). This second view contends that minor situational 
factors, and thus simple external interventions, are likely to shape giving behavior. My findings 
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dovetail well with this later work and illuminates new intervention possibilities—i.e., the default 
choice format—to increase philanthropy. Furthermore, my results suggest that the default option 
is likely to take effect when people make decisions passively. 
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Table 2.6. Summary of all studies. 
# Factor Type of 
decision 
Topic Participants N Default Control Diff (D-C)  d (D-C) 
1 Ability Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $0.1 reward 
to a child cancer organization 
MTurkers 122 50% 48% 2% .04 
2 Ability Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $0.1 reward 
to a child cancer organization hypothetically with unlimited 
decision time 
MTurkers 60 50% 57% −7% −0.15 
  Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $0.1 reward 
to a child cancer organization hypothetically with 2 seconds 
decision time 
MTurkers 59 73% 31% 42%* 0.99 
3 Ability Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $1 reward to 
an athletic department with 2 seconds decision time 
Undergradu
ates 
45 73% 30% 43%* 1.01 
  Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $1 reward to 
an athletic department with unlimited decision time 
Undergradu
ates 
39 50% 26% 24%* .58 
  Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $1 reward to 
an athletic department with 2 seconds of decision time, after 
being delayed by a task 
Undergradu
ates 
46 87% 9% 78%* 2.32 
  Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $1 reward to 
an athletic department with unlimited decision time, after being 
delayed by a task 
Undergradu
ates 
40 67% 26% 41%* .97 
4 Motivation Earning Participants deciding whether or not to participate in an 
additional survey for an extra $0.3 reward 
MTurkers 80 73% 93% −20%* −.88 
  Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $0.3 reward 
to a child cancer organization 
MTurkers 79 56% 33% 23%* .52 
5 Motivation Earning Participants deciding whether or not to participate in an 
additional survey for an extra $0.01 reward 
MTurkers 148 34% 51% −17%* −.39 
  Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $0.01 reward 
to a child cancer organization 
MTurkers 145 88% 74% 14%* .52 
6 Ability & 
Motivation 
Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $0.3 reward 
to a child cancer organization with unlimited decision time, after 
being induced to think about own interest 
MTurkers 123 34% 26% 8% .21 
  Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $0.3 reward 
to a child cancer organization with unlimited decision time, after 
being induced to think about others’ interest 
MTurkers 123 34% 33% 1% .02 
 Donation Participants deciding whether or not to donate extra $0.3 reward 
to a child cancer organization with unlimited decision time 
MTurkers 124 26% 32% −6% −.16 
NOTE.— * denotes that the difference was significant at p < .05. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ACTING BY A DEADLINE: 
THE EFFECTS OF ACTION-INACTION GOALS ON CONSUMER DECISIONS 
Deadlines can promote actions in compliance with various recommendations, from 
purchasing products (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Brannon & Brock, 2001a; Inman et al., 1997) to 
signing up for health plans (Shu & Gneezy, 2010). They often work because they can focus 
people’s attention on offers or serve as heuristic cues that signal good, must have products (for 
reviews, see Brock & Mazzocco, 2004; Cialdini, 2001; Lynn, 1991). In so doing, deadlines are 
likely to operate within the broader motivational state of an individual. This paper is concerned 
with the question of whether general action or inaction goals can be brought to bear when people 
make a decision by a deadline. Specifically, will more immediate deadlines instill greater 
compliance with an offer when recipients have an action goal or an inaction goal?  
In this research, I examined how general action and inaction goals elicited by ordinary 
physical activities affect purchase behaviors when deadlines are present. Drawing from extant 
literature on general action and inaction goals (Albarracín et al., 2008; Albarracín, Hepler, & 
Tannenbaum, 2011; Gendolla & Silvestrini, 2010; Laran, 2010) and embodied cognition 
(Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Krishna & Schwarz, 2014; Williams & Bargh, 2008), I 
proposed that both actual and imagined physical behaviors trigger general action or inaction 
goals. Specifically, active behaviors (e.g., walking, running) may provoke general action goals, 
whereas inactive behaviors (e.g., standing, sitting) may elicit general inaction goals. Once the 
general goals are activated, they may affect perceived motivational fit with action cues such as 
deadlines, that influence subsequent, unrelated behavior. When the deadline signals immediate 
action, people with a general action goal may perceive a better motivational fit than those who 
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have a general inaction goal. By contrast, deadlines that signal distant action may render general 
action-inaction goals less relevant and therefore less impactful. 
This line of reasoning has two implications. First, immediate deadlines are likely to be 
more action-relevant and garner more attention compared to distant deadlines. Second, when the 
deadline requires action or has relevance for ongoing decisions, preexisting general goals may be 
engaged in connection to the present situation. When this connection is made, people with 
general action goals may perceive better fit with the current situation than do those with general 
inaction goals. This notion is similar to that of the regulatory fit, in which existing, temporary or 
chronic promotion (vs. prevention) goals are readily applicable to promotion-focused messages 
and decisions (Avnet & Higgins, 2006; Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Lee & Aaker, 2004). In 
this case, general action or inaction goals may be more relevant in contexts that engage 
immediate action decisions than in contexts where behavioral decisions may be delayed into the 
distant future. These ideas were examined in four studies, in which I drew upon enacted or 
recalled behaviors (e.g., walking, standing) to manipulate general action and inaction goals, and 
tested my hypothesis across various consumption and health scenarios, including real coupon 
redemption and a hypothetical flu shot. These studies are presented after a review of relevant 
literature and a description of my novel hypotheses. 
General Action-Inaction Goals and Deadlines 
Deadlines often signal the need to mobilize cognitive and physical effort (Aggarwal, Jun, 
& Huh, 2011; Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; Inman et al., 1997; for reviews see Cialdini, 2001; 
Brock & Mazzocco, 2004; Lynn, 1991). Recent research has identified that overall levels of 
cognitive and physical effort mobilization can be regulated by general action and inaction goals 
(Albarracín et al., 2008; Albarracín, Wang, & Leeper, 2009; Gendolla & Silvestrini, 2010; Laran, 
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2010; for reviews see Albarracín et al., 2008; Albarracín, Hepler, & Tannenbaum, 2011). The 
two lines of research, though disconnected in the extant literature, hinge together in the present 
work by bearing on the same point of effort mobilization. 
General Action and Inaction Goals 
General action or inaction goals, once activated, motivate individuals to attain active and 
inactive end states through a variety of behavioral means. In contrast with specific goals (e.g., 
Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001; Kruglanski et al., 2002), general 
goals affect behaviors regardless of the type of behavior being considered. Albarracín and 
colleagues incidentally exposed participants to either action-related words (e.g., active, go, move) 
or inaction-related words (e.g., sleep, stop, stand) to prime the general action and inaction goals. 
They found that people exposed to action-related words put forth more effort and showed a 
higher level of activity in various situations than did those exposed to inaction-related words. As 
examples, participants in action conditions selected drawing over sleeping, ate more snacks, 
solved more intellectual problems, and exercised longer than did participants in inaction 
conditions (Albarracín et al., 2008, 2009). Moreover, regions with higher naturally occurring 
general action tendencies— indexed by daily physical exercise and stimulant use—had more 
political participation as indicated by turnout to presidential elections (Noguchi, Handley, & 
Albarracín, 2011). In sum, there is evidence that general action and inaction goals affect various 
types of behaviors. Yet there remains a dearth of knowledge as to how and when these general 
goals are connected to a particular situation that generates specific goals.   
Deadlines 
Immediate deadlines, compared with distant deadlines, can promote action through 
mobilizing more behavioral and/or cognitive effort (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ariely. Ockenfels, & 
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Roth, 2005; Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; Brannon & Brock, 2001a; Inman et al., 1997; for 
reviews see Cialdini, 2001; Brock & Mazzocco, 2004; Lynn, 1991). For instance, when a 
deadline is tighter, people are more likely to take actions such as purchasing products (Aggarwal 
et al., 2011; Brannon & Brock, 2001a; Inman et al., 1997), signing up for health plans (Shu & 
Gneezy, 2010), bidding for auctions (Ariely et al., 2005; Roth & Ockenfels, 2002), or making 
difficult decisions (Dhar & Nowlis, 1999). Furthermore, deadlines may also increase elaboration 
on the messages. For instance, people buy more limited-time candy when the promotional 
message provides more favorable descriptions of the product, but not when the message provides 
less favorable descriptions (Brannon & Brock, 2001b; also see Inman et al., 1997), suggesting 
that deadlines increase evaluation of the offers. In a nutshell, immediate deadlines often create 
pressure for more behavioral and cognitive effort.  
Such effort-demanding situations may create ideal conditions for goal engagement 
(Atkinson, 1958; Brehm & Self, 1989; Gendolla, 1999; Smith & Oyserman, 2015). Specifically, 
in situations demanding effort, people may employ available goals to guide their effort 
mobilization. In a study about memory performance, participants who were primed (vs. not 
primed) with a performance goal exerted more effort only when the memory task was difficult, 
but not when the memory task was easy—suggesting that the effort-demanding situation made 
available goals relevant and likely to be engaged in the specific context (Gendolla, 1999). This 
demonstration of the effect of task difficulty by Gendolla (1999) was seminal but does not speak 
directly to my question about the role of time in decisions. In a very different context, I proposed 
that the behavioral and cognitive effort inspired by an immediate deadline may enable the 
connection of general action and inaction goals in specific present contexts. That is, the effect of 
general action and inaction goals on decisions may be more likely to be observed in immediate 
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vs. distant contexts. To the best of my knowledge, this important theoretical aspect has never 
been tested directly. Elucidating interactions between general action-inaction goals and temporal 
contexts should therefore contribute to—and go above and beyond—all prior work. 
In summary, I proposed to consider the influence of immediate vs. distant deadlines in 
relation to such motivational states as general action and inaction goals. When a potential 
purchase is constrained by an immediate deadline, people primed with a general action goal may 
be more likely to purchase than those primed with a general inaction goal, because purchasing 
before the immediate deadline requires more behavioral and cognitive effort, which facilitates 
the employment of general action and inaction goals. By contrast, distant deadlines may create 
less ideal conditions for the engagement of general action and inaction goals. Of course, distant 
deadlines could, in principle, work with general inaction goals. For example, past research has 
shown that participants who were primed with general inaction goals by slogan such as You 
Deserve a Break Today enjoyed processing simple product information to a larger extent than 
did those who were primed with general action goals by slogans such as Just Do It. In contrast, 
action primes lead to increased enjoyment of processing complex product information to a larger 
extent than did inaction primes (Laran, 2010). However, with regard to deadlines, considerable 
evidence points to the fact that distant deadlines reduce attention and are dismissed by consumers 
as motivational opportunities (Cialdini, 2001; Brock & Mazzocco, 2004; Lynn, 1991). Thus, I 
favored the prediction that distant deadlines would reduce or eliminate the effect of general 
action-inaction goals.   
Overview of The Present Research 
In the present research, I proposed that action and inaction goals may be primed by 
enacted or recalled physical behaviors, such as walking and sitting. Whereas in past work, action 
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and inaction goals were elicited by presenting words (Albarracín et al., 2008; Gendolla & 
Silvestrini, 2010), advertisements (Albarracín et al., 2009), or slogans (Laran, 2010), I proposed 
that physical behavior may also activate general action and inaction goals. In particular, active 
behaviors (e.g., walking, running) may provoke general action goals, whereas inactive behaviors 
(e.g., standing, sitting) may elicit general inaction goals.  
This proposition is supported by several streams of research. The development of gross 
motor skills including sitting, standing, walking and running often accompany the pursuit of 
active and inactive behavioral goals from infancy, when finer motor skills are still undeveloped 
(Kopp, 1982; Thelen, 1995). Therefore, general action-inaction goals may be fundamentally tied 
to these gross motor behaviors, as another example of the embodiment of motivation (e.g., 
Cacioppo et al., 1993; Centerbar & Clore, 2006; Hung & Labroo, 2011; Yap, Wazlawek, Lucas, 
Cuddy, & Carney, 2013). Furthermore, researchers have often used words representing active 
behaviors such as move and go to stimulate general action goals, and those representing inactive 
behaviors such as stand and sleep to elicit general inaction goals (Albarracín et al., 2008; Laran, 
2010; Gendolla & Silvestrini, 2010; Silvestrini & Gendolla, 2013; see also Voracek & 
Sonnleitner, 2015). The success of those primes may indicate that some of these specific words 
were ideally positioned to prime general action and inaction goals. In contrast to previous 
research emphasizing particular modules of bodily sensation and movement connected to 
specific concepts (e.g., Lee & Schwarz, 2010; Topolinski, Maschmann, Pecher, & Winkielman, 
2014), I proposed that gross motor movement may elicit corresponding mental representations of 
action or inaction that in turn activate general action-inaction goals. Once in place, these general 
goals may influence purchase decisions depending on the deadlines of the marketing offers. 
When consumption is possible only by an immediate deadline, those primed with a general 
  
	
48 
action goal may increase effort and thus increase purchase intention to a greater extent than those 
primed with a general inaction goal. In contrast, when the purchase behavior is accompanied by 
a distant deadline, decisions may not be affected by general goals.  
I tested my hypothesis via one field experiment and three lab experiments. Imminent 
deadlines lead to greater compliance with the recommended behavior after being primed with 
action rather than inaction goals. In Study 1, I distributed coupons with various deadlines to 
participants who were walking or standing in a student union and measured coupon redemption 
behaviors. In Study 2, I asked participants who were either walking or standing, and had 
respectively higher and lower levels of action goals, to indicate their intentions for upcoming 
behavioral decisions with various time limits. In Study 3, I manipulated participants’ general 
action or inaction goals by having them imagine running or standing, thus replicating the effects 
of these activities with a mental manipulation of goals. Study 4 tested the proposed fit as a 
mechanism underlying the predicted effect. A control condition was introduced in Studies 2 and 
4. Control conditions in the area of general action-inaction goals are relatively uninformative 
because experimental participants come to the laboratory with an ongoing motivational state that 
is more or less active, and there is no natural neutral state. The default for study participants is 
often active, as they are engaged in daily pursuits and have normally just commuted to the lab 
(see e.g., Albarracín et al., 2008). Thus, the nature of an induced goal is best established by 
comparison with a subjective standard such as self-reported activity (i.e., is the supposed action 
goal condition subjectively active?) than by comparison with a control that may also be active. 
Nonetheless, a control condition is critical to ensure that the experimental goal conditions are 
neither above nor both below a baseline control, as that would imply the induction of either two 
action goals or two inaction goals (for an elaboration of this problem, see Albarracín et al., 2008). 
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Study 1 was important in measuring behavioral decisions in a naturalistic context but is 
naturally less precise than the three subsequent experiments manipulating action and inaction 
goals. Specifically, the field study included an observation of natural movement (sitting or 
walking) in a student union, with the purchase of beverage and food items with immediate or 
delayed deadlines being manipulated. As one might expect, people who sit might regularly spend 
more time at the union and thus be more habitual consumers, which required us to take into 
account purchasing baselines that may correlate with movement. Fortunately, the use of an 
experimental methodology in later studies permitted more direct casual conclusions with 
manipulated perceived or actual movement. The experiments observed effects on purchasing 
intentions but also measured subjectively experienced action goals, as the process was 
presumably affected by movement. Furthermore, these experiments allowed us to rule out effects 
of movement with positive or negative affect (Miller & Krizan, 2016), and thus isolate 
psychological processes much more precisely. They also allowed us to compare whether the 
effects of movement were likely mediated by action goals as opposed to affective consequences 
of such goals on arousal levels (e.g., experienced fatigue or boredom). 
Study 1 
In Study 1, I carried out a field experiment to test the effect of the general action-inaction 
goals instilled by ordinary physical activities on redemption of real coupons by various deadlines. 
Participants who were either walking or sitting in a student union received coupons for use at a 
local café within the union by either an immediate or distant deadline. I then analyzed 
redemption rates as a function of the naturally occurring action (walking) or inaction (sitting) and 
the manipulated deadlines. 
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Method 
Pretest. As participants sitting in the lounges of the student union might spend more time 
in the building than those who just pass by, those who were sitting might have had a higher 
chance of visiting the local café than those who were passing by. I thus pretested the baseline 
likelihood of making purchases in the café among people who were either walking or sitting in 
the lounges of the student union. Two research assistants who were blind to the hypotheses 
approached 60 individuals (45% female) who were either walking or sitting in the lounges of the 
union. To exclude any unwanted effects from social influence and past behavior, the research 
assistants only approached people who were alone and did not have any visible beverage or food 
items at the time. Each participant was asked five questions with response options of yes or no. 
These questions and the corresponding percentages of participants who responded yes were: (1) 
Are you likely to purchase any food or beverage items from the Espresso Royale café at the 
Union today? (Walking vs. Sitting: 6.7% vs. 26.7%, χ2 (1) = 4.320, p = .038); (2) Have you 
purchased anything from the Espresso Royale café in the past? (Walking vs. Sitting: 53% vs. 
80%, χ2 (1) = 4.800, p = .028); (3) Have you purchased anything from any other establishments at 
the Union in the past? (Walking vs. Sitting: 83% vs. 93%, χ2 (1) = 1.456, p = .228); (4) Have you 
purchased anything from the Espresso Royale today? (Walking vs. Sitting: 13% vs. 3%, χ2(1) = 
1.964, p = .161) and (5) Are you likely to purchase any food or beverage items from any of the 
establishments at the Union today? (Walking vs. Sitting: 46.7% vs. 26.7%, χ2 (1) = 2.584, p 
= .108).  
As shown by the results, more participants sitting in the lounges of the union had made a 
purchase in the Espresso Royale café in the past and indicated higher intentions to shop in the 
café on the day of the study than those who walked in the union. These results confirmed my 
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prediction that people who sat in the union were more likely to be consumers at the café than 
people who simply walked by. As intentions predict future behaviors (Albarracín, Johnson, 
Fishbein, & Muellerleile, 2001; Albarracín & Wyer, 2000; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), I used 
participants’ intentions to shop in the café on this day as the baseline likelihood of purchasing at 
the café in the future, and included it as a covariate in the main analyses. 
Main experiment.  I employed a 2 General Action-Inaction Goals (Action vs. Inaction) 
× 2 Deadline (Immediate vs. Distant) between-subjects design, with the goal being a variable 
triggered by naturally occurring walking or sitting. Two research assistants unaware of my 
hypotheses approached people who either walked (action goal) or sat (inaction goal) alone in the 
union and offered them coupons worth one dollar at the café. Coupons would either expire in one 
hour (immediate deadline) or be valid throughout the day (distant deadline) and could be used to 
purchase any of the café products. In total, five hundred and sixty-one coupons were distributed 
on the day of my study, and one hundred and twenty coupons (21%) were redeemed in the café 
by the end of that day. 
Results and Discussion 
Coupon redemption behavior. A logistic regression was performed with the coupon 
redemption behavior as the outcome and action (effect coding: action = 1, inaction = −1), 
deadline (effect coding: immediate = 1, distant = −1), their interaction term, and the base 
purchase intention as predictors.  The omnibus test suggested that the model was significant, χ2 (3) 
=14.705, p = .002. As predicted, the interaction between the action and the deadline on coupon 
redemption was significant, B = 0.220, p = .038. Furthermore, the main effect of deadline was 
also significant, B = −.274, p = .010, implying that there were more people redeeming the 
coupons in the distant deadline condition than in the immediate deadline condition, No other 
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effects were significant. To further probe the interaction, I conducted the following analysis: if a 
participant redeemed the coupon, his or her probability of redeeming the coupon was 100%; 
otherwise, his or her probability of using the coupon was 0%. After subtracting the baseline 
probabilities of purchasing intent measured in the pretest, I found that in the presence of a distant 
deadline (throughout the day), the coupon redemption did not differ as a function of walking or 
sitting (Action: M = 13%, SD =40% vs. Inaction: M = 7%, SD = 47%), F (1, 557) = 1.517, p 
= .219. In contrast, in the presence of an immediate deadline (one hour), participants who were 
walking in the student union (M = 11%, SD = 38%) made more purchases than participants who 
were sitting in the union lounges (M = −11%, SD = 36%, F (1, 557) = 20.637, p < .001 (see 
Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1. Means of difference between actual coupon redemption chance and baseline coupon 
redemption intention (Study 1).  
 
NOTE.— Bars represent mean standard errors. 
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Study 1 thus confirmed my prediction in a natural setting. People with action goals (e.g., 
walking) redeemed coupons by an immediate deadline more often than did those with inaction 
goals (e.g., sitting). As discussed earlier, walking and sitting may stimulate a general action and 
inaction goal respectively. An immediate (vs. distant) deadline that requires prompt action is 
more demanding and thus is ideal for the recruitment of general action goals as a basis for a 
decision. As predicted, general action-inaction goals had no effect on the coupon redemption 
behavior when the deadline was distant, an effect that was replicated in the following 
experimental studies. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, I manipulated the general action and inaction goals by asking participants to 
walk or stand in the lab before indicating their purchase intentions concerning a flu shot offered 
on sale, with or without an immediate deadline. I also had a control group in which participants 
were not asked to walk or stand before indicating purchase intentions, although one can expect 
the control to have a general action goal to begin with (see Albarracín et al., 2008; Albarracín, 
Hepler, & Tannenbaum, 2011). Furthermore, I measured participants’ attitudes toward the flu 
shot for control purposes. I predicted that, in the face of an immediate (vs. a distant) deadline, 
participants in the action goal condition (i.e., walking) would be more likely to purchase the flu 
shot than participants in the inaction goal condition (i.e., standing). The control condition might 
resemble the action goal condition since participants have just walked to the lab to participate in 
the study, but it was important to know what the baseline was. 
Method 
Participants and design. I employed a 3 General Action-Inaction Goals (Action vs. 
Inaction vs. Control) × 2 Deadline (Immediate vs. Distant) between-subjects design. Two 
  
	
54 
hundred and eighteen undergraduates (51% female; 72% native speakers of English; 48% 
Caucasian, 3% African American, 6% Hispanic, 41% Asian, 2% other ethnicity) participated in 
this experiment in exchange for course credit. Participants’ ages ranged from 19 to 26 years (M = 
20.13, SD = 2.22).  
Procedure and measures. Participants arrived in the lab in small groups. After signing 
the consent forms, participants were told to clear their minds by imagining themselves in real 
shopping situations. To ostensibly help them in this task, participants were asked to either walk 
around (Action) or stand in a line (Inaction) in an open area of the lab for three minutes. After 
that, participants were directed to go back to their seats to complete questionnaires. Participants 
in the control condition were not asked to do such activities. In the questionnaires, participants 
were asked to consider what they would do if they received a coupon for a 50% discount on a flu 
shot at a nearby clinic. The health clinic would continue to be open either for 5 minutes 
(immediate deadline) or for the day (distant deadline), at which point only customers already in 
the clinic would be able to receive the shot. Participants were then asked to indicate their 
willingness to check out the flu shot sale (from 0 = won’t go at all to 10 = will definitely go) and 
to purchase the vaccine (from 0 = not at all likely to 10 = very likely) using 11-point scales. The 
average of these two items was used as a measure of purchasing intention (α =. 893). After that, 
participants reported their attitudes about purchasing the flu shot by stating if they were not 
interested in the flu shot (reverse-scored), liked the idea of the flu shot, getting the flu shot was a 
good idea, and getting the flu shot seemed beneficial (from 0 = not at all, to 10 = very much; α 
= .869). Participants’ attitudes were not influenced by the general action-inaction goals and 
deadline manipulations (Action-immediate: M = 5.58, SD = 2.59; Inaction-immediate: M = 4.08, 
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SD = 2.33; Action-distant: M = 5.07, SD = 2.72; Inaction-distant: M = 5.05, SD = 2.30; Control-
immediate: M = 5.19, SD = 2.93; Control-distant: M = 5.16, SD = 2.39), all Fs < 1.8.  
Finally, as manipulation checks for physical feelings, participants reported the extent to 
which, during the walking/standing task, they felt they were moving, static (reverse-scored), 
active, and passive (reverse-scored) using 11-point scales (from 0 = not at all, to 10 = very much, 
α = .859). Furthermore, to directly check the general action-inaction goals, participants were also 
asked to fill in seven items measuring their general action-inaction goal. Specifically, they were 
asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with these statements: (1) During this study, I 
was feeling energetic; (2) If I could, I would take a nap after this session (reverse-scored); (3) If I 
could, I would go work out after this session; (4) During this study, I wanted to get some rest 
(reverse-scored); (5) Today I am motivated to get a lot of work done; (6) My goal for today is to 
relax as much as possible (reverse-scored) on an 11-point scale (from 0 = Not at all to 10 = Very 
much, α = .685). Additionally, they also reported the extent to which they felt they were tired and 
bored using 11-point scales (from 0 = not at all, to 10 = very much). These items were included 
to rule out possible influences of my manipulations on arousal level (α = .607). Participants in 
the control condition were not asked to answer the questions since they did not complete the 
walking/standing task. Instead, they were asked to indicate their perception of the deadline as a 
way to check the manipulation success of the deadline. Specifically, they were asked to indicate 
the extent to which they perceived that the deadline to purchase the flu shot was too tight/too 
loose, they had too little time/ample time, the deadline required acting right away/allowed ample 
time to act, the deadline was not likely feasible/likely feasible, and it was very hard to meet/very 
easy to meet. Participants used 11-point scales (from 0 to 10) on which lower numbers indicated 
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feelings of more immediacy of the deadline (see all the manipulations and measures in Appendix 
G). The average of the items was used as a measure of deadline distance (α = .865).  
Results  
Manipulation checks. As predicted, the general action-inaction goals manipulation 
significantly affected reports of physical feelings. Participants who walked reported more 
moving feelings (M = 6.59, SD = 1.85) than did participants who stood still (M = 2.62, SD = 
1.84), F (1, 143) = 171.283, p < .001. More importantly, participants who walked had stronger 
action goals (M = 5.29, SD = 1.59) than did participants who stood still (M = 4.71, SD = 1.86), F 
(1, 143) = 4.636, p = .033. No other effects were significant, both Fs < 1.7. These results 
indicated that the general action-inaction goals were successfully primed.  
I also checked the effects of goal manipulations on arousal. I found that participants who 
stood still (M = 7.51, SD = 1.86) reported feeling more tired and more bored than did those who 
walked (M = 5.36, SD = 2.11), F (1, 143) = 42.779, p < .001). However, these responses were 
not correlated with purchase intentions, p = .725, and thus could not account for any results in 
the principal outcome variable. No other effects were significant, both Fs < 1.  
With respect to the deadline manipulation, as expected, participants in the control group 
indicated that the five-minute deadline (M = 3.07, SD = 2.42) was tighter than the one-day 
deadline (M = 4.92, SD = 1.70), F (1, 69) = 13.908, p < .001, suggesting a successful 
manipulation of the deadline.  
Effects on purchase intentions. As in Study 1, there was a significant two-way 
interaction between the general action-inaction goals and the deadline on behavioral intentions, F 
(2, 212) = 6.835, p = .001, η2 = .061. The main effects of action and deadline were not 
significant, both Fs < 1.0. In the presence of an immediate deadline, participants in the general 
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action goals condition (i.e., walking, M = 3.65, SD = 2.95) were more likely to purchase the flu 
shot than were participants in the general inaction goals condition (i.e., standing, M = 1.93, SD = 
1.93), F (1, 212) = 7.05, p = .009, but not more than those in the control condition, F < 0.1. 
Participants in the general inaction goals condition also had lower purchase intention than those 
in the control condition (M = 3.82, SD =3.31), F (1, 212) = 8.788, p = .003. In contrast, in the 
presence of a distant deadline, the behavioral intentions of participants were not influenced by 
the manipulated general goals (action: M = 3.11, SD = 2.59; inaction: M = 3.68, SD = 2.63; 
control: M = 2.27, SD = 2.77), F (2, 212) = 2.339, p = .128 (see Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2. Means of purchase intentions (Study 2).  
 
NOTE.— Bars represent mean standard errors. 
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participants primed with the general inaction goals. However, as predicted, when the deadline 
was distant, the general goals had no impact on the intention.  
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence of the hypothesized effect of the general action-
inaction goals and the deadline on behavior and intention to enact a recommended behavior. In 
my prior studies, the general action-inaction goals were gauged by the naturally occurring 
movements of walking and sitting or by a manipulation of gross movement. In Study 3, I aimed 
to manipulate the general action-inaction goals via imagined movement, because embodiment 
could be soft and activated by mental representation (Cohen & Leung, 2009; Leung & Cohen, 
2007). Specifically, participants were asked to imagine and write about either running or 
standing, before indicating their purchase intention for a sale. I predicted the general action-
inaction goals primed by imagined movement would be the same as for naturally occurring 
movement and manipulated real movement. 
Method  
Participants and design. I used a 2 General Action-Inaction Goals (Action vs. Inaction) 
× 2 Deadline (Immediate vs. Distant) between-subjects design. Two hundred and three Amazon 
Mechanical Turk workers residing in the United States (52% female; 97% native speakers of 
English; 77% Caucasian, 7% African American, 5% Hispanic, 9% Asian, 2% other ethnicity) 
participated in this experiment in exchange for a small monetary reward. Participants’ ages 
ranged from 18 to 70 years (M = 33.39, SD = 11.99).  
Procedure and measures. To manipulate the general action-inaction goals, participants 
were asked to imagine a situation in which they were either running or standing. They were 
asked to describe the situation and the physical experience in as much detail as possible. 
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Afterward, participants received the same flu shot sale scenario as in Study 2, in which they were 
asked to consider what they would do if they received a coupon for a 50% discounted flu-shot at 
a nearby clinic. The health clinic would continue to be open either for 5 minutes (immediate 
deadline) or for the day (distant deadline). Participants indicated their purchase intentions 
concerning the flu shot sale (α = .972), using the same measures as the previous study. For 
control purposes, participants also indicated their attitudes toward purchasing the flu shot with 
the same procedures as in Study 2 (α = .902). Attitude was only affected by the general action-
inaction goal (F (1, 199)= 13.864, p < .001), but not affected by either the deadline or the 
interaction term of general action-inaction goal and deadline, both ps > .10. Finally, participants 
completed the same manipulation checks of physical feelings (α  = .855), the self-reported 
general action-inaction goal (α = .690), and the arousal checks (α = .557) used in previous 
studies (see all the manipulations and measures in Appendix H).  
Results 
Manipulation checks. As in the previous study, the imagination task was associated with 
reported physical feelings. Participants who imagined running reported more moving feelings (M 
= 6.30, SD = 2.53) than did participants who imagined standing (M = 3.24, SD = 2.14), F (1, 199) 
= 85.264, p < .001. Furthermore, participants who imagined running also reported a stronger 
general action goal (M = 6.23, SD = 1.78) than did those participants who imagined standing (M 
= 5.50, SD = 1.79), F (1, 199) = 8.509, p < .01. No other effects were significant, both Fs < 0.1. 
These results indicated that imagined movement successfully primed the general action-inaction 
goals. As in Study 2, participants who imagined standing (M = 3.98, SD = 2.87) reported feeling 
more tired and bored than did those in the action condition (M = 2.80, SD = 2.15), F (1, 199) = 
11.212, p = .001. As before, however, these items did not correlate with purchase intentions, p 
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= .309. No other effects on arousal were significant, both Fs < 1, and thus will not be discussed 
further. 
Effects on purchase intentions. I analyzed purchase intentions as a function of the 
general action-inaction goals, deadline, and their interaction term. As in the previous studies, 
there was a significant two-way interaction between the general action-inaction goals and the 
deadline, F (1, 199) = 9.283, p = .003, η2 = .045. The main effect of the general action goal was 
significant, F (1, 199) = 22.650, p < .001, η2 = .102, and the main effect of the deadline was 
marginally significant, F (1, 199) = 2.788, p =.097, η2 =.014. In the presence of an immediate 
deadline, participants in the general action goal condition (M = 4.60, SD = 3.83) had stronger 
purchase intentions than those in the inaction goal condition (M = 0.97, SD = 1.58), F (1, 199) = 
29.930, p < .001. In the presence of a distant deadline, however, behavioral intentions were 
unaffected by the general goal manipulation (action: M = 3.96, SD = 3.75; inaction: M = 3.16, 
SD = 3.40), F (1, 199) = 1.493, n.s (See figure 3.3). Because attitude correlated with intention 
significantly, r = .777, p < .001, I thus ran a separate analysis with attitude as a covariate. After 
controlling for attitude, all of the effects remained the same. 
Discussion 
Study 3 replicated earlier findings with imagined movement. The results suggested that 
the general action-inaction goal might be primed through imagined movement. Supposedly, 
imagining movement brought up memories of being physically active in the past, while 
imagining standing brought up memories of being physically inactive, which then mobilized the 
general action and inaction goals, respectively. The general action (vs. inaction) goal in turn 
affected participants’ purchase intention by the immediate deadline. However, in the absence of 
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an immediate deadline, the general action and inaction goals became irrelevant and thus was not 
applied to the situation.  
Figure 3.3. Means of purchase intentions (Study 3).  
 
NOTE.— Bars represent mean standard errors. 
 
Study 4 
In Study 4, I measured the proposed mechanism—perceived fit—as well as deadline 
relevance. I used imagined movement as the way to manipulate the general action-inaction goals. 
Method  
Participants and design. I used a 3 General Action-Inaction Goals (Action vs. Inaction 
vs. Control) × 2 Deadline (Immediate vs. Distant) between-subjects design. Two hundred and 
eighty-nine undergraduates (59% female; 60% native speakers of English; 39% Caucasian, 5% 
African American, 5% Hispanic, 50% Asian, 2% other ethnicity) participated in this experiment 
in exchange for course credits. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 32 years (M = 20.18, SD = 
1.40).  
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Procedure and measures. Participants were randomly assigned to imagine moving or 
standing, using the same mental-imagining task as in Study 3. After the imagination task, 
participants read the same flu shot sale scenario as the previous studies. The immediate deadline 
was 5 minutes and the distant deadline was throughout the day. The participants indicated their 
purchase intentions concerning the flu shot sale on two items (α = .917). After that, participants 
were asked to indicate the extent to which they perceived fit on two items: (1) I felt like attending 
the flu shot sale would just flow from how I was feeling; (2) Attending the flu shot sale just felt 
natural (α = .788). Furthermore, participants also indicated the relevance of the deadline on two 
items: (1) The deadline of the flu shot sale was relevant to my decision to get the shot; (2) I paid 
a lot of attention to the deadline (α = .756). In addition, participants also reported their attitudes 
toward getting the flu shot (α =. 872) on three items: (1) I liked the idea of the flu shot; (2) 
Getting the flu shot was a good idea; (3) Getting the flu shot seemed beneficial (α = .872). 
Finally, except for participants in the control condition, participants completed the same 
manipulation checks of physical feelings (α = .704) used in previous studies, and the arousal 
check about the extent to which they felt they were tired, bored, jittery, and anxious using 11-
point scales (from 0 = not at all, to 10 = very much, α = .529) All of the participants also 
completed the manipulation checks of the general action-inaction goal (α = .606) and the 
deadline perception (α = .733) as in Study 2 (see all the manipulations and measures in 
Appendix I).  
Results 
Manipulation checks. As in the previous study, the imagination task produced the 
expected physical feelings. Participants who imagined running reported more moving feelings 
(M = 5.10, SD = 2.00) than did those participants who imagined standing (M = 3.92, SD = 1.89), 
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F (1, 189) = 17.803, p < .001. Furthermore, participants in the general action goal condition (M = 
4.55, SD = 1.57) indicated that they had a higher general action goal than those in the general 
inaction goal condition (M = 4.08, SD = 1.75), F (1, 283) = 3.879, p = .049. Participants in the 
control condition (M = 4.65, SD = 1.61) also had a higher general action goal than those in the 
general inaction condition, F (1, 283) = 5.710, p = .018, but did not differ from those in the 
general action condition, F < 0.2. These results suggested that the general action-inaction goal 
manipulation was successful and participants in the control condition had a similar level of 
action goals as those in the general action goal condition. In addition, participants who received 
an immediate deadline perceived themselves to have less time (M = 3.35, SD = 2.09) than did 
those who received a distant deadline (M = 4.91, SD = 1.43), F (1, 283) = 54.368, p < .001. 
Finally, there were no differences for participants in any arousal measures across the action and 
inaction conditions, all Fs < 1.1, and thus will not be discussed further.  
Effects on purchase intentions. I analyzed purchase intentions as a function of action 
and deadline. As in the previous studies, there was a significant two-way interaction between the 
general action-inaction goal condition and deadline on intentions, F (2, 283) = 4.126, p = .017, 
η2 = .028. Neither the main effect of action condition nor the main effect of deadline were 
significant, ps > .16. A simple contrast analysis was performed to probe the interaction. In the 
presence of an immediate deadline, participants in the general inaction goal condition (M = 2.50, 
SD = 2.73) had weaker purchase intentions than those participants in the general action goal 
condition (M = 4.00, SD = 3.03), F (1, 283) = 6.925, p = .009, as well as those participants in 
control conditions (M = 4.09, SD = 2.70), F (1, 283) = 7.737, p =. 006. In this immediate-
deadline condition, the purchase intentions in the general action goal and control conditions did 
not differ, F < 0.5. In the presence of a distant deadline, however, behavioral intentions were 
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unaffected by the general action-inaction goal conditions (Action: M = 2.79, SD = 2.69; Inaction: 
M = 3.55, SD = 2.79; Control: M = 3.51, SD = 2.95), F (1, 283) = 1.151, n.s. Again, attitude was 
not influenced by the manipulations, all ps > .14, but correlated with intention (r = .719, p 
< .001). However, results remained the same after controlling for attitude. 
Effects on deadline relevance. I found that participants perceived the deadline to be 
more relevant to their decision when the deadline was immediate (M = 4.21, SD = 2.70) than 
when it was distant (M = 2.91, SD = 2.63), F (1, 283) = 17.036, p < .001. No other effects were 
significant, Fs< 1.0.  
Effects on perceived fit. I found a significant two-way interaction between the general 
action-inaction goal and the deadline on perceived fit, F (2, 283) = 3.725, p = .025, η2 = .026. 
When there was an immediate deadline, participants in the general inaction goal condition (M = 
2.67, SD = 2.38) felt less fit than did participants in the general action goal condition (M = 3.82, 
SD = 2.28), F (1, 283) = 5.573, p = .019, and those in the control condition (M = 3.99, SD = 
2.48), F (1, 283) = 7.315, p = .007. When there was a distant deadline, however, perceived fit 
was unrelated to the general action-inaction goal conditions (action: M = 2.74, SD = 2.56; 
inaction: M = 3.33, SD = 2.54; control: M = 3.14, SD = 2.11), F (2, 283) = 0.750, n.s. (See Figure 
3.4).  
Mediated moderation analysis. I used a bootstrap analysis with 5,000 samples (Model 8, 
Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) to test the mediated-moderation model with perceived fit as 
the mediator. Results showed that the interaction of the general action-inaction goal and the 
deadline on purchase intentions was significantly mediated by perceived fit, effect size = 0.6891, 
SE (Boot) = 0.2822, 95% CI (0.1353, 1.2330). Furthermore, when there was an immediate deadline, 
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perceived fit mediated the effect of action on intention, effect size = 0.4542, SE (Boot) = 0.1844, 95% 
CI (0.0828, 0.8323).  The mediation model appears in Figure 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.4. Means of purchase intentions and perceived fit (Study 4).  
 
NOTE.— Bars represent mean standard errors. 
 
Figure 3.5. Mediation model in the presence of the immediate deadline (Study 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE.—All of the βs are standardized; the beta in the bracket denotes the direct effect of the general 
action and inaction goals (1 = action, 0 = control; −1 = inaction) on purchase intentions before mediation; 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Discussion 
As in previous studies, with the presence of an immediate deadline, participants in the 
general action goal condition were more likely to purchase the flu shot than were participants in 
the general inaction goal conditions. Participants in the control condition reported having 
similarly high general action goals as those in the general action goal condition: thus, their 
purchase intention was influenced by the deadline in a similar way to those in the general action 
goal condition. This finding may be due in part to participants usually walking to the lab, and 
thus possessing similar levels of action goals relative to the action primed ones.  Furthermore, 
the mechanism measures of Study 4 supported my proposed mechanism that perceived fit 
mediated the combined effect of the general action-inaction goal and deadline on purchase 
intentions. Participants in the general action goal condition perceived more fit with the 
immediate action cue (i.e., immediate deadline) and thus had higher purchase intentions than 
those in the general inaction goal condition. The results also suggested that the deadline became 
more relevant to the behavioral decision when it was immediate rather than when it was distant. 
General Discussion 
Across four experiments (see summary in Table 3.1), I investigated the effect of general 
goals and deadlines on behavioral intentions. I found that when the deadline of an offer was 
immediate, people primed with action goals had stronger purchase intentions than those primed 
with inaction goals, regardless of the type of product or service being considered. However, 
when the deadline was distant and thus less demanding, the general goals were uninfluential. I 
manipulated the general goals by either measuring naturally occurring physical behaviors or 
having participants enact or recall physical behaviors across various consumption situations. 
Study 1 showed that walking participants were more likely to redeem coupons with an 
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immediate (vs. distant) deadline than those who were seated. Study 2 included a manipulation of 
general goals by asking participants to walk or stand in the lab, thus avoiding any confounding 
effects of naturally occurring movement. Study 3 included a manipulation of general goals by 
having participants imagine running or standing, and replicated the earlier effects. Finally, Study 
4 found support for the proposed fit mechanism underlying the effect. 
 
Table 3.1. Main results of all studies in chapter 3. 
                 Deadline 
Study 1: Coupon redemption in the field Immediate 
M (SD) 
Distant  
M (SD) 
Coupon redemption rate  Action 11%a (38%) 13%a (40%) 
  Inaction  -11%b (36%) 7%a (47%) 
Study 2: Real movement & flu shot  Immediate 
M (SD) 
Distant  
M (SD) 
Purchase intentions  Action  3.65a (2.95) 3.11a (2.59) 
  Inaction 1.93b (1.93) 3.68a (2.63) 
  Control 3.82a (3.31) 2.27a (2.77) 
Study 3: Imagined movement & flu shot Immediate 
M (SD) 
Distant 
M (SD) 
Purchase intentions  Action  4.60a (3.83) 3.96a (3.75) 
   Inaction  0.97b (1.58) 3.16a (3.40) 
Study 4: Imagined movement with control Immediate 
M (SD) 
Distant 
M (SD) 
Purchase intentions  Action  4.00a (3.03) 2.79a (2.69) 
   Inaction  2.50b (2.73) 3.55a (2.79) 
  Control 4.09a (2.70) 3.51a (2.95) 
Perceived fit*  Action  3.82a (2.28) 2.74a (2.56) 
  Inaction  2.67b (2.38) 3.33a (2.54) 
  Control 3.99a (2.48) 3.14a (2.11) 
NOTE.—Cells with different superscripts in a column differ at p < .05. *Higher number means more fit. 
 
This research provides a new perspective on how the general action and inaction goals of 
consumers can exert a surprising and influential impact on future consumer behaviors and 
intentions. Past research has suggested that general action-inaction concepts and goals influence 
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specific behaviors in a variety of contexts (e.g., Albarracín et al., 2008; Gendolla & Silvestrini, 
2010; Laran, 2010). As an example, people who were incidentally exposed to action-related 
words, such as active and go preferred drawing over sleeping, exercised for a longer time, ate 
more, and solved more anagrams than did those in conditions where they were exposed to 
inaction-related words, such as sleep and stop (Albarracín et al., 2008). The present research 
contributes to this past literature not only by highlighting important consumer consequences, but 
also by identifying temporal urgency as a factor that prompts the use of general action and 
inaction goals in a particular behavioral situation.  
My studies revealed that deadlines are more effective for increasing compliance with a 
recommendation when people engage in or imagine active behaviors, such as walking and 
running, but not when they engage in or imagine inactive behaviors, such as sitting and standing. 
In prior studies on deadlines (e.g., Brannon & Brock, 2001a), participants were actually moving 
or engaged in a neutral state before receiving the deadline. Participants in Brannon and Brock 
(2001a) were driving through a local Mexican fast-food restaurant when they were asked to buy 
Cinnamon Twists as part of a limited-time offer. In other research showing beneficial effects of 
deadlines on compliance, participants likely had spontaneous general action goals (e.g., 
Aggarwal et al., 2011; Janakiraman & Ordóñez, 2012; Ramanathan & Dhar, 2010; Vermeir & 
Van Kenhove, 2005). Contrary to past research on the effects of deadlines, my studies suggest 
that deadlines can decrease compliance with a recommendation when people engage in or 
imagine inactive behaviors. This finding may be useful to marketers if they target relatively 
inactive consumers such as those who frequently sit in front of a TV or a computer. In these 
cases, marketers are probably better off using distant deadlines rather than immediate deadlines 
in their marketing communications. 
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In line with previous research on embodiment, my studies found that consumers’ enacted 
or imagined physical behaviors influence the effectiveness of limited-time strategies to a great 
extent by activating distinct general goals. However, departing from previous research focused 
on establishing the connection between bodily experience and cognitions (e.g., concepts, feelings, 
and metaphors; Krishna & Schwarz, 2014), my research furthers the literature by investigating 
how the embodiment of action and inaction can inform people of their general motivational 
states.  
In closing, physical behaviors surrounding decisions may be objectively irrelevant, but 
this irrelevance does not make them inconsequential. My research provides evidence of the 
combined effects of deadlines and general action-inaction goals on decision making in ways not 
easily anticipated by prior scholarship. Active and inactive physical behaviors can stimulate 
general goals, but these goals matter only when people are pressed by time. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
Across two series of studies, I investigated how active and inactive behaviors affect present 
or subsequent behaviors, intentions and performance. The first series of studies (Essay 1) 
investigated the situational conditions that lead to active and inactive behaviors in the decision 
making process, and showed that people are more likely to accept the default option when they 
engage in passive decision making, but are more likely to ignore or question the default option 
when they engage in active decision making. The second series of studies (Essay 2) examined 
the goals elicited by active and inactive behaviors, and suggested that general action goals 
increase immediate intentions and actions by altering the perceived motivational fit with the 
deadline.  
Essay 1 has implications for the literature on choice structure. Although a default option 
has often been found to increase behavioral compliance, the power of this nudge actually 
depends on the underlying assumption that people are passive in making decisions. I found that 
the passive decision making process is likely to be triggered by short decision time, a time delay, 
and lack of motivation to make the decision. These results have implications for policy making 
regarding when to employ the default option. For example, the default option may be better 
employed when people make decisions quickly, make decisions after a time delay, or when they 
are less motivated to make the decisions. If people have sufficient ability and motivation to make 
decisions, it may be better to use a control choice format instead of a default option format.  
Essay 2 has implications for marketing promotion. Despite the ubiquity of the limited-
time strategy in marketing, prior theorizing is silent on the likely effects of consumers’ actions 
while they are making decisions about the limited-time offers. In Essay 2, I found that physical 
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activity levels of consumers can have a surprising and powerful impact on their consumer 
decisions, because the general action (vs. inaction) goals triggered by active (vs. inactive) 
behaviors increase the perceived motivational fit with the limited time. This research makes 
several contributions. First, it demonstrates that general action and inaction goals have important 
consequences with regard to consumer behaviors and decisions. Second, it implements enacted 
and recalled physical activities as a new way to prime general action-inaction goals. Third, by 
showing that the presence of an immediate deadline enables the effects of general action and 
inaction goals in consumer decision making, I connect otherwise separate lines of research on 
time-limited strategies and general action-inaction goals. 
In closing, these two essays contribute to our understanding of how behaviors of varying 
activity levels affect present and subsequent decisions, intentions, and performance in consumer 
and social contexts. 
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APPENDIX A 
MATERIALS FROM STUDY 1 OF ESSAY 1 
Default Choice Format Condition: 
 
If you do NOT want to donate the extra $0.1 you earned to the children's cancer nonprofit 
organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT 
check it, you will donate the money.  
    
 
Control Choice Format Condition: 
 
If you want to donate the extra $0.1 you earned to the children's cancer nonprofit 
organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT 
check it, you will not donate the money and will receive the money at the end of the study.  
    
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APPENDIX B 
MATERIALS FROM STUDY 2 OF ESSAY 1 
We would like to know if you want to donate the $0.10 extra reward in a hypothetical 
donation scenario. You will get the $0.10 extra reward regardless of your choice in the following 
scenario. We just want to know what you might do if you encounter this scenario. 
 
Default Choice Format & Unlimited Time Condition: 
If you do NOT want to donate the extra $0.1 you earned to the children's cancer nonprofit 
organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT 
check it, you will donate the money. You have unlimited time to make your choice. 
 
   Check the box besides the smiley face to NOT donate the extra $0.1 reward to the 
children’s cancer nonprofit organization. Otherwise, you will donate the money but will receive 
your original payment $0.5 at the end of the study. 
 
Control Choice Format & Unlimited Time Condition: 
If you want to donate the extra $0.1 you earned to the children's cancer nonprofit 
organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT 
check it, you will not donate the money and will receive the money at the end of the study. You 
have unlimited time to make your choice. 
 
   Check the box besides the smiley face to donate the extra $0.1 reward to the children's 
cancer nonprofit organization. Otherwise, you will receive the extra money along with your 
original payment $0.5 at the end of the study. 
 
Default Choice Format & Limited Time Condition: 
If you do NOT want to donate the extra $0.1 you earned to the children's cancer nonprofit 
organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT 
check it, you will donate the money. You have 2 seconds to make your choice on the next page. 
 
   Check the box besides the smiley face to NOT donate the extra $0.1 reward to the 
children’s cancer nonprofit organization. Otherwise, you will donate the money but will receive 
your original payment $0.5 at the end of the study. 
 
Control Choice Format & Limited Time Condition: 
If you want to donate the extra $0.1 you earned to the children's cancer nonprofit 
organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT 
check it, you will not donate the money and will receive the money at the end of the study. You 
have 2 seconds to make your choice on the next page. 
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   Check the box besides the smiley face to donate the extra $0.1 reward to the children's 
cancer nonprofit organization. Otherwise, you will receive the extra money along with your 
original payment $0.5 at the end of the study. 
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APPENDIX C 
MATERIALS FROM STUDY 3 OF ESSAY 1 
Default Choice Format, Unlimited Time, & Immediate Decision Condition: 
On the next page, you will see a smiley face next to “Thank You”. If you do NOT want 
to donate the $1 dollar you earned to a university athletic department, please click on the smiley 
face on the next page. If you do NOT click on it, you will donate the money. You have unlimited 
time to make your choice. 
 
 
Control Choice Format, Unlimited Time, & Immediate Decision Condition:  
On the next page, you will see a smiley face next to “Thank You”. If you want to donate 
the $1 dollar you earned to a university athletic department, please click on the smiley face on 
the next page. If you do NOT click on it, you will not donate the money and will receive your $1 
at the end of the study. You have unlimited time to make your choice. 
 
 
Default Choice Format, Limited Time, & Immediate Decision Condition: 
On the next page, you will see a smiley face next to “Thank You”. If you do NOT want 
to donate the $1 dollar you earned to a university athletic department, please click on the smiley 
face on the next page. If you do NOT click on it after 2 seconds, you will donate the money. 
 
 
Control Choice Format, Limited Time, & Immediate Decision Condition: 
On the next page, you will see a smiley face next to “Thank You”. If you want to donate 
the $1 dollar you earned to a university athletic department, please click on the smiley face on 
the next page. If you do NOT click on it after 2 seconds, you will not donate the money and will 
receive your $1 at the end of the study.  
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Default Choice Format, Unlimited Time, & Delay Decision Condition: 
On the last page at the end of the questionnaire, you will see a smiley face next to “Thank 
You”. If you do NOT want to donate the $1 dollar you earned to a university athletic department, 
please click on the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT click on it, you will donate the 
money. You have unlimited time to make your choice. 
 
 
Control Choice Format, Unlimited Time, & Delay Decision Condition: 
On the last page at the end of the questionnaire, you will see a smiley face next to “Thank 
You”. If you want to donate the $1 dollar you earned to a university athletic department, please 
click on the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT click on it, you will not donate the 
money and will receive your $1 at the end of the study. You have unlimited time to make your 
choice. 
 
 
Default Choice Format, Limited Time, & Delay Decision Condition: 
On the last page at the end of the questionnaire, you will see a smiley face next to “Thank 
You”. If you do NOT want to donate the $1 dollar you earned to a university athletic department, 
please click on the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT click on it after 2 seconds, you 
will donate the money. 
 
 
Control Choice Format, Limited Time, & Delay Decision Condition: 
On the last page at the end of the questionnaire, you will see a smiley face next to “Thank 
You”. If you want to donate the $1 dollar you earned to a university athletic department, please 
click on the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT click on it after 2 seconds, you will not 
donate the money and will receive your $1 at the end of the study.  
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APPENDIX D 
MATERIALS FROM STUDY 4 OF ESSAY 1 
Default Choice Format & Additional Survey Condition: 
If you do NOT want to complete this additional survey for extra $0.3, please check the 
box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT check it, you will be directed to the 
additional survey when you proceed to the next page. You have unlimited time to make your 
choice on the next page.  
   Check the box besides the smiley face to NOT participate in the additional survey (extra 
5 minutes for extra reward $0.3). Otherwise, you will be directed to the additional survey on the 
next page. 
 
Control Choice Format & Additional Survey Condition: 
If you want to complete this additional survey for the extra $0.3, please check the box 
besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT check it, you will skip the additional 
survey. You have unlimited time to make your choice on the next page.  
☐  Check the box besides the smiley face to participate in the additional survey (extra 5 
minutes for extra reward $0.3). Otherwise, you will receive your original payment $0.5 at the 
end of the study. 
 
Default Choice Format & Donation Condition: 
If you do NOT want to donate the extra $0.3 you earned to the children's cancer nonprofit 
organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT 
check it, you will donate the money. You have unlimited time to make your choice. 
   Check the box besides the smiley face to NOT donate the extra $0.3 reward to the 
children’s cancer nonprofit organization. Otherwise, you will donate the money but will receive 
your original payment $0.5 at the end of the study. 
 
Control Choice Format & Donation Condition: 
If you want to donate the extra $0.3 you earned to the children's cancer nonprofit 
organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT 
check it, you will not donate the money and will receive the money at the end of the study. You 
have unlimited time to make your choice. 
   Check the box besides the smiley face to donate the extra $0.3 reward to the children's 
cancer nonprofit organization. Otherwise, you will receive the extra money along with your 
original payment $0.5 at the end of the study. 
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APPENDIX E 
MATERIALS FROM STUDY 5 OF ESSAY 1 
Default Choice Format & Additional Survey Condition: 
If you do NOT want to complete this additional survey for extra $0.01, please check the 
box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT check it, you will be directed to the 
additional survey when you proceed to the next page. You have unlimited time to make your 
choice on the next page.  
   Check the box besides the smiley face to NOT participate in the additional survey (extra 
5 minutes for extra reward $0.01). Otherwise, you will be directed to the additional survey on the 
next page. 
 
Control Choice Format & Additional Survey Condition: 
If you want to complete this additional survey for the extra $0.01, please check the box 
besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT check it, you will skip the additional 
survey. You have unlimited time to make your choice on the next page.  
☐  Check the box besides the smiley face to participate in the additional survey (extra 5 
minutes for extra reward $0.01). Otherwise, you will receive your original payment $0.5 at the 
end of the study. 
 
Default Choice Format & Donation Condition: 
If you do NOT want to donate the extra $0.01 you earned to the children's cancer 
nonprofit organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do 
NOT check it, you will donate the money. You have unlimited time to make your choice. 
   Check the box besides the smiley face to NOT donate the extra $0.01 reward to the 
children’s cancer nonprofit organization. Otherwise, you will donate the money but will receive 
your original payment $0.5 at the end of the study. 
 
Control Choice Format & Donation Condition: 
If you want to donate the extra $0.01 you earned to the children's cancer nonprofit 
organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT 
check it, you will not donate the money and will receive the money at the end of the study. You 
have unlimited time to make your choice. 
   Check the box besides the smiley face to donate the extra $0.01 reward to the children's 
cancer nonprofit organization. Otherwise, you will receive the extra money along with your 
original payment $0.5 at the end of the study. 
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APPENDIX F 
MATERIALS FROM STUDY 6 OF ESSAY 1 
Self-interest Condition: 
In the next study, we are interested in how people make decisions. You will have the 
opportunity to make a real donation to a health cause. It is important for you to make your 
decision in your best interest, trying to be rational and follow what will benefit you personally. 
Please think about the choices that work best for you. Your choices will be completely 
anonymous.  
 
Other-interest Condition: 
In the next study, we are interested in how people make decisions. You will have the 
opportunity to make a real donation to a health cause. It is important for you to make your 
decision in other’s best interest, trying to be compassionate and follow important values. Please 
think about the choices that work best for those in need of help. Your choices will be completely 
anonymous.  
 
Default Choice Format Condition: 
If you do NOT want to donate the extra $0.1 you earned to the children's cancer nonprofit 
organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT 
check it, you will donate the money. You have unlimited time to make your choice. 
   Check the box besides the smiley face to NOT donate the extra $0.1 reward to the 
children’s cancer nonprofit organization. Otherwise, you will donate the money but will receive 
your original payment $0.5 at the end of the study. 
 
Control Choice Format Condition: 
If you want to donate the extra $0.1 you earned to the children's cancer nonprofit 
organization, please check the box besides the smiley face on the next page. If you do NOT 
check it, you will not donate the money and will receive the money at the end of the study. You 
have unlimited time to make your choice. 
   Check the box besides the smiley face to donate the extra $0.1 reward to the children's 
cancer nonprofit organization. Otherwise, you will receive the extra money along with your 
original payment $0.5 at the end of the study. 
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APPENDIX G 
MATERIALS FROM STUDY 2 OF ESSAY 2 
Action Condition:  
We are interested in how people make consumer decisions in daily shopping situations. 
You will be asked to perform several different tasks that you often perform when you shop. 
Because we would like to simulate real shopping situations, we want you to first clear up your 
mind and imagine being in a daily situation. To help you to do so, we would like you to come to 
this open space and imagine that you are going shopping. Please walk around in this open space 
as you often do in shopping situations.  
 
Inaction Condition:  
We are interested in how people make consumer decisions in daily shopping situations. 
You will be asked to perform several different tasks that you often perform when you shop. 
Because we would like to simulate real shopping situations, we want you to first clear up your 
mind and imagine being in a daily situation. To help you to do so, we would like you to come to 
this open space and imagine that you are going shopping. Please stand still on this open space as 
you often do in shopping situations. 
 
Immediate Deadline Condition: 
You have received a 50% off coupon for a highly attractive flu-shot sale at a health store. 
The health store will continue open for 5 minutes, at which point only customers who are in the 
clinic can receive the shot. 
 
Distant Deadline Condition: 
You have received a 50% off coupon for a highly attractive flu-shot sale at a health store. 
The health store will continue open throughout the day, so that customers can receive the shot in 
clinic for the rest of the day. 
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Measures of Purchase Intention: 
 
1. Will you go to the store to check out the flu shot sale? 
    Won’t go at all                                                                                      Will definitely go 
     0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
  
2. Are you likely to buy the flu shot?  
    Not likely at all                                                                                      Very much likely 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Measures of Attitude: 
 
1. I was not interested in the flu shot. 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
  
2. I liked the idea of the flu shot. 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
  
3. Getting the flu shot was a good idea. 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
  
4. Getting the flu shot seemed beneficial. 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Manipulation Checks of General Action-Inaction Goals (only in Action and Inaction 
conditions): 
 
1. During this study, I was feeling energetic. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
2. If I could, I would take a nap after this session. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
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3. If I could, I would go work out after this session. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
4. During this study, I wanted to get some rest.  
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
5. Today I was motivated to get a lot of work done. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
6. My goal for today was to relax as much as possible. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
Measures of Physical Feelings (only in Action and Inaction conditions): 
 
1. Thinking about when you were completing the First Task in the open space, did you feel 
that you were moving at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
 
2. Thinking about when you were completing the First Task in the open space, did you feel 
that you were static at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
 
3. Thinking about when you were completing the First Task in the open space, did you feel 
that you were active at that time?  
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
4. Thinking about when you were completing the First Task in the open space, did you feel 
that you were passive at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Measures of the Arousal Level (only in Action and Inaction conditions):  
 
1. Thinking about when you were completing the First Task in the open space, did you feel 
tired at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
2. Thinking about when you were completing the First Task in the open space, did you feel 
bored at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
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Manipulation Checks of Deadlines (only in Control condition): 
 
1. The deadline to get the flu shot was: 
 
Very loose                                                                                            Very tight 
0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
  
Too little time                                                                                     Ample time 
0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Required acting right away                                                        Allowed ample time to act 
0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
  
Not likely feasible                                                                           Likely feasible 
0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
  
Very hard to meet                                                                         Very easy to meet 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
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APPENDIX H 
MATERIALS FROM STUDY 3 OF ESSAY 2 
Action Condition: 
 
Please imagine that you are in a situation: You are running. Please describe briefly the 
situation (where you are, when) and what the physical experience feels like in as much detail as 
possible. Do not worry about grammar or punctuation. 
 
Inaction Condition: 
 
Please imagine that you are in a situation: You are standing. Please describe briefly the 
situation (where you are, when) and what the physical experience feels like in as much detail as 
possible. Do not worry about grammar or punctuation. 
 
Immediate Deadline Condition: 
 
You have received a 50% off coupon for a highly attractive flu-shot sale at a health store. 
The health store will continue open for 5 minutes, at which point only customers who are in the 
clinic can receive the shot. 
 
Distant Deadline Condition: 
 
You have received a 50% off coupon for a highly attractive flu-shot sale at a health store. 
The health store will continue open throughout the day, so that customers can receive the shot in 
clinic for the rest of the day. 
 
Measures of Purchase Intention: 
 
1. Will you go to the store to check out the flu shot sale? 
    Won’t go at all                                                                                      Will definitely go 
     0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
2. Are you likely to buy the flu shot?  
    Not likely at all                                                                                      Very much likely 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
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Measures of Attitude: 
 
1. I was not interested in the flu shot. 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
2. I liked the idea of the flu shot. 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
3. Getting the flu shot was a good idea. 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
4. Getting the flu shot seemed beneficial. 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Manipulation Checks of General Action-Inaction Goals: 
 
1. During this study, I was feeling energetic. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
2. If I could, I would take a nap after this session. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
3. If I could, I would go work out after this session. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
4. During this study, I wanted to get some rest.  
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
5. Today I was motivated to get a lot of work done. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
6. My goal for today was to relax as much as possible. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
Measures of Physical Feelings: 
 
1. Thinking about when you were completing the Imagination Task, did you feel that you were 
moving at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
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2. Thinking about when you were completing the Imagination Task, did you feel that you were 
static at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
3. Thinking about when you were completing the Imagination Task, did you feel that you were 
active at that time?  
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
4. Thinking about when you were completing the Imagination Task, did you feel that you were 
passive at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Measures of the Arousal Level: 
 
1. Thinking about when you were completing the Imagination Task, did you feel tired at that 
time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
2. Thinking about when you were completing Imagination Task, did you feel bored at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
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APPENDIX I 
MATERIALS FROM STUDY 4 OF ESSAY 2 
Action Condition: 
 
Please imagine that you are in a situation: You are running. Please describe briefly the 
situation (where you are, when) and what the physical experience feels like in as much detail as 
possible. Do not worry about grammar or punctuation. 
 
Inaction Condition: 
 
Please imagine that you are in a situation: You are standing. Please describe briefly the 
situation (where you are, when) and what the physical experience feels like in as much detail as 
possible. Do not worry about grammar or punctuation. 
 
Immediate Deadline Condition: 
You have received a 50% off coupon for a highly attractive flu-shot sale at a health store. 
The health store will continue open for 5 minutes, at which point only customers who are in the 
clinic can receive the shot. 
Distant Deadline Condition: 
You have received a 50% off coupon for a highly attractive flu-shot sale at a health store. 
The health store will continue open throughout the day, so that customers can receive the shot in 
clinic for the rest of the day. 
Measures of Purchase Intention: 
 
1. Will you go to the store to check out the flu shot sale? 
    Won’t go at all                                                                                      Will definitely go 
     0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
2. Are you likely to buy the flu shot?  
    Not likely at all                                                                                      Very much likely 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
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Measures of Perceived fit: 
 
1. I felt like attending the sale would just flow from how I was feeling.  
 Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
2. Attending the sale just felt natural.  
 Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Measures of Relevance of the Deadline: 
 
1. The deadline of the flu shot sale was relevant to my decision to get the shot. 
 Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
2. I paid a lot of attention to the deadline. 
 Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Measures of Attitude: 
 
1. I liked the idea of the flu shot. 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
2. Getting the flu shot was a good idea. 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
3. Getting the flu shot seemed beneficial. 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
 
Manipulation Checks of General Action-Inaction Goals: 
 
1. During this study, I was feeling energetic. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
2. If I could, I would take a nap after this session. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
3. If I could, I would go work out after this session. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
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4. During this study, I wanted to get some rest.  
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
5. Today I was motivated to get a lot of work done. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
6. My goal for today was to relax as much as possible. 
    Not at all       0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10       Extremely 
 
Manipulation Checks of Deadlines: 
 
1. The deadline to get the flu shot was: 
 
Very loose                                                                                            Very tight 
0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Too little time                                                                                     Ample time 
0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Required acting right away                                                        Allowed ample time to act 
0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Not likely feasible                                                                           Likely feasible 
0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Very hard to meet                                                                         Very easy to meet 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Measures of Physical Feelings (only in Action and Inaction Conditions): 
 
1. Thinking about when you were completing the Imagination Task, did you feel that you were 
moving at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
 
2. Thinking about when you were completing the Imagination Task, did you feel that you were 
static at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
3. Thinking about when you were completing the Imagination Task, did you feel that you were 
active at that time?  
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
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4. Thinking about when you were completing the Imagination Task, did you feel that you were 
passive at that time? 
Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
Measures of the Arousal Level: 
 
1. When making my decision about the flu shot, I felt tired.  
 Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
2. When making my decision about the flu shot, I felt bored.  
 Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
 
3. When making my decision about the flu shot, I felt jittery.  
 Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10  
 
4. When making my decision about the flu shot, I felt anxious.  
 Not at all                                                                                               Very much 
      0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
 
  
 
 
 
